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I. INTRODUCTION
Blakely v. Washington's potential impact on hidden sentencing
proceedings 2 has been almost entirely unexplored. Largely concealed from
the public eye, components of hidden sentencing such as probation, parole,
and post-release supervision have been ignored by both scholars and policy-
makers. 3 Blakely and its progeny, however, compel us to reexamine the
nature of these proceedings that can significantly increase an offender's
punishment, as well as the constitutional and theoretical problems that may
arise. A consistent application of Blakely may well revolutionize these often
neglected aspects of criminal sentencing. 4
The Court's recent sentencing reforms also suggest a new philosophy of
punishment for sentencing, something that has so far been woefully
undertheorized. 5 In response, this Article identifies a new paradigm of
retributive justice which underpins the Court's latest sentencing decisions. I
contend that the Court's new understanding of sentencing is grounded in the
rediscovered historical right of the jury to decide punishment for offenders-
* Assistant Professor of Law, Willamette University; J.D., Yale University; B.A.,
M.A., English, University of Pennsylvania. Special thanks are owed to Doug Berman,
Bennett Capers, Nora Demleitner, Jeff Dobbins, David Friedman, Tony Kronman, Hans
Linde, Terry O'Reilly, Nick Rosenkranz, Norm Silber, Jeff Standen, Bob Weisberg,
Norman Williams, and Ron Wright, as well as the participants at Thomas Jefferson's
faculty workshop, for their comments on earlier drafts. Thanks also to Willamette for
their research support.
I Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (reaffirming a criminal offender's
ight to a jury's determination of facts which increase the maximum sentence).
2 For the purposes of this piece, I define "hidden sentence proceedings" as those
sentencing components taking place either before or after the actual sentencing hearing,
often increasing an offender's punishment.
3 Douglas Berman, Joan Petersilia, Jeremy Travis, and Robert Weisberg are notable
exceptions.
4 For purposes of this piece, I focus on six types of hidden sentencing proceedings:
pre-sentence reports, prior offender statutes, probation, parole, post-release supervision,
and restitution. I do not consider this a complete list, however-only the most common.
5 As Doug Berman and Stephanos Bibas have noted, "[t]hough jurists and
philosophers have long debated theoretical justifications for punishment, structural and
procedural principles for sentencing have rarely received sustained attention." Douglas
A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 37,
40 (2006).
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specifically, in the community's central role determining an offender's moral
blameworthiness. 6 Accordingly, I argue that an expressive retributive theory
of punishment best explains the Court's most recent sentencing reforms. My
conception of expressive retribution encompasses the historical antecedents
of the Sixth Amendment jury right, the importance of community
participation, and some very modem ideas of why we pufiish.
In short, I aim to explore the broader question of what Blakely means for
all aspects of sentencing and where Blakely's animating principle might lead,
both practically and philosophically. I do so by analyzing a combination of
sentencing doctrine, punishment theory, and empirical observations of
sentencing schemes and applying them to hidden sentencing.
Blakely has focused attention on a broad swath of fact-finding decisions
in sentencing. Some very important questions arise from these cases, such
as: Where do "facts" originate? What makes them legitimate? Who may
determine them? Blakely suggests that facts used in sentencing decisions can
only be determined by one body: the jury. In so doing, Blakely opens the
door to a host of complex and unanswered issues about the many other kinds
of discretionary decisions informing all of sentencing. Nonetheless,
Blakely's potential effect on hidden sentencing has been almost entirely
ignored. 7
These hidden (or ancillary) sentencing proceedings function on the basis
of factual determinations typically made far from the imprimatur of the jury
or even a judge. They frequently serve as the functional equivalent of the
original sentencing hearing, sometimes increasing the length and type of a
convicted offender's punishment. Yet these proceedings receive little
attention and oversight.
Although Blakely did not specifically address hidden sentencing
proceedings, its animating principle-that the jury must find all facts
increasing punishment 8-raises important questions about who has authority
6 This modified expressive retributive theory of punishment also calls the use of plea
bargains, guilty pleas, bench trials, and bench sentencing into question. Moreover, I
would argue that similar philosophical concerns animate other areas of criminal justice,
including the death penalty. I do not explore these curtailments of traditional jury rights
here, however.
7 But cf Jeremy Travis, President, John Jay Coll. of Criminal Justice, Keynote
Address at the Stanford Criminal Justice Center Symposium: Strategic Responses to
Technical Violations of Parole and New Crime Among Parolees (Nov. 4, 2006)
(transcript on file with author).
8 Defining what the court meant by "punishment" is a central challenge of this piece.
I do not believe that "every" imposition on prisoners or convicted offenders constitutes
punishment. I would, however, define punishment fairly broadly, certainly including
1308 [Vol. 68:1307
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to affect, enhance, or otherwise critically change a convicted offender's
sentence. Broadly interpreted, the Blakely Court's statement that "every
defendant has the right to insist that the prosecutor prove to a jury all facts
legally essential to the punishment" 9 will undoubtedly impact more than a
small band of sentencing decisions.10
Extremely important decision making occurs during hidden sentencing,
and it would be a mistake to neglect these proceedings in favor of a narrow
interpretation of Blakely. Because Blakely encourages us to focus on
questions of origin and legitimacy in sentencing, it should spur us to
reevaluate the last twenty years of ancillary sentencing policy and practices,
starting with Jones v. United StatesI and culminating with Blakely, United
States v. Booker,12 Shepard v. United States,13 Washington v. Recuenco, 14
and Cunningham v. California.15 Reviewing the Blakely line of cases helps
illustrate the Court's movement towards a more expansive interpretation of
the jury's role in determining all kinds of sentencing punishment.
Carefully explored, the animating principle of Blakely has much to teach
us about the viability of hidden sentencing proceedings. Accordingly, I will
examine Blakely's effect on a variety of ancillary sentencing proceedings
that take place both before and after the sentencing hearing. In doing so, I
will also look at the jurisprudential underpinnings of the Court's recent
sentencing decisions.
In Part II, I take a brief look at Blakely, Jones, Apprendi, Ring v.
Arizona,16 Almendarez-Torres v. United States,17 Shepard, Recuenco, and
most back-end sentencing practices. See generally Travis, supra note 7, at 4 (noting that
the "workings of the back end of our justice" are forms of "invisible punishment"). For a
more in-depth discussion of how philosophical ideas of punishment affect sentencing
reform, see Alice Ristroph, Desert, Democracy, and Sentencing Reform, 96 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1293 (2006).
9 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004).
10 As Doug Berman correctly argues, "the ramifications of Blakely for modem
sentencing reforms-and for past, present, and future sentences--cannot be overstated."
Douglas A. Berman, The Roots and Realities of Blakely, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2005, at
5,6.
11 526 U.S. 227 (1999).
12 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
13 544 U.S. 13 (2005).
14 126 S. Ct. 2546 (2006) (holding that some errors in Blakely application can be
considered harmless).
15 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007).
16 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
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Cunningham. In particular, I review how the origins and legitimacy of facts
in sentencing have been the Court's concern since at least Jones and how
Blakely has newly focused our attentions upon this underexplored area of
criminal sentencing. Part III explores how the Court's rediscovery of the
Sixth Amendment jury right supports an expressive retributive jurisprudence
of sentencing. Subsection A provides a brief history of American sentencing
theory. Subsection B explains how expressive retribution supports the
jurisprudence of recent sentencing decisions, which itself authenticates the
Blakely changes to ancillary sentencing. Finally, Part IV addresses ancillary
sentencing proceedings in the wake of Blakely. Subsection A uses expressive
retributive justice principles as a guidepost for modifying ancillary
sentencing proceedings. Subsection B reviews the history of hidden
sentencing and surveys some common state ancillary sentences, both front-
end and back-end. Throughout, I explore how Blakely's animating principles
and theoretical underpinnings might affect and reshape hidden sentencing.
If Blakely casts a bright beam of light on the subject of fact-finding at
the primary sentencing proceeding, then I am ultimately interested in
expanding the circumference of that beam. In so doing, I hope to further the
"robust national dialogue"'18 about sentencing that Blakely has engendered,
as well as enhance our understanding of the Court's new sentencing reforms.
II. ORIGINS AND LEGITIMACY IN THE JOURNEY TO BLAKELY
Blakely and its progeny may be recent decisions, but over the last
decade, the Supreme Court laid the groundwork for this sentencing policy
shift by gradually "re-discovering" a criminal offender's Sixth Amendment
jury trial right during sentencing. Of course, the Constitution has always
protected each criminal defendant against conviction "except upon proof
beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged,"' 19 and gives him the right to insist that "a jury find
him guilty of all the elements of the crime with which he is charged. '20 As
the Court recently commented, these two basic ideas-that all elements of a
crime must be found by a jury, beyond a reasonable doubt, for a valid
17 523 U.S. 224 (1998).
18 Douglas A. Berman, Conceptualizing Blakely, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 89, 93
(2004).
19 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
20 United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 511 (1995).
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conviction-"provided the basis for [its] ... decisions interpreting modem
criminal statutes and sentencing procedures." '2 1
Until quite recently, however, an offender's right to these. Sixth
Amendment guarantees was submerged in a century's worth of decisions
that effectively hid the applicability of the right to jury trial, criminal
sentencing. To best see how this right was uncovered, we must return to the
cases directly preceding Blakely, which laid the groundwork for this
supposed "watershed" change in Court sentencing jurisprudence.
A. Laying the Groundwork for Blakely
The first real sign of the Court's Sixth Amendment rediscovery was in
Jones v. United States,22 a case largely ignored until Blakely.23 Jones
involved a statute that had three different possible maximum sentences,
depending on the victim's harm. The Court held that because the harmto the
victim was an element of the crime, this fact's determination must be given
the full jury-based due process required by any other offense element.24 In
doing so, the Court observed that "any fact (other than prior conviction) that
increases the maximum penalty for a crime must be charged in an
indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt."'25
One of the chief concerns in Jones was to determine the history and
boundaries of the constitutional safeguards for fact-finding procedures,
2 1See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 230 (2005).
22 526 U.S. 227 (1999). Some scholars argue that the true predecessors to Blakely
began much earlier with In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361 (1970) (announcing the
"requirement that guilt of a criminal charge be established by proof beyond a. reasonable
doubt"), and Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975) (finding unconstitutional a Maine
statute that shifted to defendant the burden of proving a mens rea lower than malice
aforethought). See Robert Weisberg, Excerpts from "The Future of American
Sentencing: A National Roundtable on Blakely," 2 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 619, 624 (2005)
(quoting Ronald Allen). See also Douglas Berman, Reconceptualizing Sentencing, 2005
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 17-18 (2005). I regard Jones as containing the nascent seeds of
Blakely, however, and begin my discussion there.
23 1 am not the first to re-examine Jones in light of Blakely; for other scholarly
discussions, see Bertrall L. Ross II, Reconciling the Booker Conflict: A Substantive Sixth
Amendment in a Real Offense Sentencing System, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y. & ETHics J.
725 (2006); Rachel E. Barkow, Originalists, Politics, and Criminal Law on the Rehnquist
Court Criminal Justice Panel, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1073 (2006).
24 Jones, 526 U.S. at 232.
25 Id. at 243 n.6.
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particularly the identity of the fact-finder. 26 By expounding on the history of
criminal sentencing as well as the Framers' concerns over jury rights, the
Jones .Court underlined the importance of the jury's control over the ultimate
verdict.27 In doing so, the Court signalled that any future "relative
diminution of the jury's significance" would raise Sixth Amendment
concerns. Although limiting the specific holding of Jones to "removing
control over facts determining a statutory sentencing range," 28 the Court
observed that "diminishment of the jury's significance" generally would
"raise a genuine Sixth Amendment issue." 29
Accordingly, the Jones Court's steadfast championing of the Sixth
Amendment right laid the groundwork for much of the change in sentencing
law that was-and is-to follow. Jones played oracle by suggesting that in a
battle between traditional governmental policies in sentencing and the
safeguarding of traditional jury rights, jury rights must triumph. 30 -
Jones's message, however, was blunted by the Almendarez-Torres prior
conviction exception. In Almendarez-Torres, the Court, by a 5-4 vote, ruled
that Congress could provide an enhanced prison sentence for a federal crime
based upon the fact of a prior conviction. 31 Since a prior conviction was only
a sentencing factor, prosecutors were not required to charge in the
indictment the fact of an earlier conviction, and the judge could make a
finding that a prior conviction existed.
A year later in Apprendi v. New Jersey,32 the Court continued to re-
discover the historical Sixth Amendment jury trial right. Apprendi declared
unconstitutional a New Jersey hate crime statute enabling a sentencing judge
to impose a sentence beyond the statutory maximum for various crimes.33
The Court held that a lengthened sentence resulting from the addition of a
"sentence enhancement" was impermissible because "any fact that increases
the penalty of a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
26 Id.
2 7 Id. at 247.
28 Id. at 248.
2 9 Id.
30 Jones, 526 U.S. at 251 n. 11 ("[I]f such policies conflict with safeguards enshrined
in the Constitution for the protection of the accused, those policies have to yield to the
constitutional guarantees.").
31 Almendarez-Torres v. United Sates, 523 U.S. 224, 226-27 (1998).
32 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
33Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 491. Under the New Jersey statute, the sentence
determination was based on the trial court's finding that an offense involved racial
animus by a preponderance of the evidence. See id.
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submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt" 34-thus
reaffirming what it had suggested in Jones.35 Sentencing facts had to be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, just like any other offense, to preserve
the jury's prerogative. 36
The Apprendi majority clarified the "starkly presented"37 question of
whether a defendant had the constitutional right to have a jury find each and
every factual element of a crime on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt. 38 The Court relied on the historical foundations of the common law as
a basis for affirmatively answering this question. In Apprendi, as in Jones,
the Court returned to the communitarian role of the jury trial in ensuring that
the state did not overreach its powers. These twelve jurors, "the great
bulwark of [our] civil and political liberties, '39 were supposed to be "twelve
of [the defendant's] equals and neighbors, '40 or part of the offender's
community. Notably, Apprendi focused on how the traditional jury trial right
required the jury to determine the truth of each accusation in every stage of
the legal process.4 1
The Court's emphasis on the community's role in measuring levels of
culpability-first discussed in Jones, where the Court considered how
eighteenth-century English juries devised extralegal ways of avoiding a
guilty verdict if the punishment for a certain offense seemed
disproportionate to the offender's conduct 42-suggests that a retributive
philosophy of punishment, based on the defendant's moral blameworthiness,
may best explain, at a jurisprudential level, what motivated the Court's
decision that the jury (and, by extension, the community) had the right to
decide all facts increasing punishment.
3 4 Id. at 490.
35 See id. at 476 (noting that the Court's reasoning had been "foreshadowed by [its]
opinion in Jones").
36 Despite the strong language in Apprendi, however, the Almendarez-Torres rule
regarding prior convictions remained. Cf Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 225-27.
3 7 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476.
38 Id. at 476.
3 9 Id. at 477 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES 540-41 (4th ed. 1873)).
40 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 343 (1769) [hereinafter BLACKSTONE]).
41 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 477.
42 See Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 245 (1999) (cited in Apprendi, 530 U.S.
at 480 n.5).
2007] 1313
OHIO STATE LA W JOURNAL
As Justice Scalia argued in his Apprendi concurrence, the Founders of
the American Republic had no intentions of leaving criminal justice to the
states. 43 Thus, the jury-trial guarantee was a very important provision of the
Bill of Rights. This guarantee that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to ... trial, by an impartial jury" promised the
criminal offender that "all the facts which must exist in order to subject the
defendant to a legally prescribed punishment must be found by the jury. 44
This interpretation ultimately became law in Blakely.45
Following Apprendi, the Court's sentencing opinions more strongly
supported jury-led fact-finding in criminal proceedings. In Ring v. Arizona,46
the Court held that if a sentencing fact critically affected an offender's
punishment, it was impermissible for the "trial judge, sitting alone," to
determine "the presence or absence of... aggravating factors" required by a
state to increase a death sentence.47 Drawing heavily on Justice Stevens's
previous dissent in Walton v. Arizona,48 the Ring Court found that any fact-
determined increase in punishment "must be found by a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt."'49 Based on this historical understanding of the Sixth
Amendment's scope, the Ring Court overruled "Walton to the extent that it
allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating
circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty. 50
Justice Scalia's Ring concurrence set out future grounds for Blakely,
finding that:
[T]he fundamental meaning of the jury-trial guarantee of the Sixth
Amendment is that all facts essential to imposition of the level of
punishment that the defendant receives-whether the statute calls them
43 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 498 (Scalia, J., concurring).
44 Id. at 499 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Breyer, J.).
45 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301-02 (2004).
46 536 U.S. 584 (2002). On the same day as it decided Ring, the Court also issued
Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545 (2002), where a fractured majority held that
permitting a judge to find facts that required imposing a mandatory minimum sentence
did not violate the defendant's constitutional rights.
47 Ring, 536 U.S. at 588.
48 497 U.S. 639, 710 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens argued that the Sixth
Amendment required a jury determination of established facts before imposition of the
death penalty, relying in part on late eighteenth-century English jury prerogatives. Id. at
710-11.
49 Ring, 536 U.S. at 602.
5 0 Id. at 609.
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elements of the offense, sentencing factors, or Mary Jane-must be found
by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 5 1
Scalia stated outright that he had "discarded [his] old ignorance 52 in failing
to realize that "the right of trial by jury is in perilous decline" 53-something
he would try to remedy in Blakely.
All of the above decisions, from Jones to Ring, helped lay Blakely's
groundwork. Although many in the academic and legal community were
surprised by Blakely, the path to rediscovering the Sixth Amendment jury
right was always present. It wasn't until Blakely, however, that the historical
right to a jury trial was fully articulated.
B. Jury Rights Triumphal in Blakely
In Blakely, the Court found that Ralph Blakely's Sixth Amendment jury
trial right was violated when a Washington state sentencing court enhanced,
his sentence based on its factual determination that his kidnapping offense
involved "deliberate cruelty."' 54 By holding that a court can only sentence a
defendant on facts found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted
by the defendant himself, the Blakely Court eliminated all judge-made
enhancement of sentences beyond their maximum. 55 Specifically, Blakely
held that "[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt," 56 defining
"maximum sentence" as what "a judge may impose solely on the basis of the
facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the defendant. 57
The Blakely Court found that its rule, originally set out in Apprendi, was
supported by two historical pillars of common-law criminal justice. Quoting
Blackstone, the Court observed:
51 Id. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring).
52 Id. at 611 (Scalia, J., concurring).
53 Id. at 612 (Scalia, J., concurring).
54 Blakely v. United States, 542 U.S. 296, 296, 305 (2004).
55 Critically, the majority found that "[w]hen a judge inflicts punishment that the
jury's verdict alone does not allow, the jury has not found all the facts 'which the law
makes essential to the punishment,' and the judge exceeds his proper authority." Id. at
304 (internal citation omitted) (quoting 1 JOHN BISHOP, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 55 (2d ed.
1872)).
56 Id. at 301 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)).
57 Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303.
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[T]he "truth of every accusation" against a defendant "should afterwards be
confirmed by the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and
neighbours," and . .. "an accusation which lacks any particular fact which
the law makes essential to the punishment is ... no accusation within the
requirements of the common law, and it is no accusation in reason."
58
The offender's right to a jury trial comprised of the community, the
Court explained, was a key reservation of the community's power in the
structuring of our government: "U]ust as suffrage ensures the people's
ultimate control in the legislative and executive branches, [a] jury trial is
meant to ensure their control in the judiciary." 59 As Blakely illustrated with a
number of historical sources, the jury-trial right was critical during the
nation's founding-so much so that the Framers decided to entrench the
jury-trial right in the Constitution because "they were unwilling to trust
government to mark out the role of the jury."60
Moreover, Blakely's wider understanding of the historical jury role also
relied on the jury's function as the public's representative and as the primary
provider of community-based punishment. The Court placed such
importance on the jury's role during sentencing in part because of its
recent-and related-emphasis on the community's traditional role in
determining moral blameworthiness.
Blakely contended that the liberal democratic decision-making vested in
the jury's determination of blameworthiness relies on the community's role
in linking punishment to the crime committed, so that the offender will feel
more responsibility for her actions. This tie between community-based
retribution and the jury's role in finding all facts relevant to punishment was
established by Blackstone, as Apprendi noted: "The defendant's ability to
predict with certainty the judgment from the face of the felony indictment
flowed from the invariable linkage of punishment with crime."
6 1
Stated differently, colonial Americans believed that the best way to
ensure that the offender felt the moral weight and indignation of the
community (as part of his punishment) was having the determination of that
punishment handed down by a fair cross-section of said community, via the
jury. Blackstone's long-standing tenet of criminal law, that "the 'truth of
every accusation' against a defendant 'should afterwards be confirmed by
58 Id. at 301-02 (internal citation omitted).
59 Id. at 306.
60 Id. at 308.
61 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478-79 (paraphrasing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, OF PUBLIC WRONGS 343 (1769)).
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the unanimous suffrage of twelve of his equals and neighbours,"' 62
underlines this point. The reason for limiting the jury to an offender's
"equals and neighbours" was precisely in order to impose the community's
judgment. When the determination of culpability is handed down by an
offender's fellow citizens rather than the state, not only is the legitimacy of
sentencing punishment increased, but the normative judgment of the
community is fully imposed.
From the earliest days of our nation, the jury trial was considered an
essential part of criminal justice because the jury itself ensured the
"judiciary remained accountable to, and aligned with, the interests of the
citizenry it purported to serve." 63 In other words, one of the key roles of the
jury at the time of the founding was to make sure that the community's
concerns remained significant in the punishment of an offender.
This punishment was not something left to the judge, but rather a
responsibility and right of a defendant's immediate society. As Akhil Amar
observed, "[t]he jury was not simply a popular body, but a local one as
well.., composed of Citizens from the same community and ... informed
by community values." 64
Indeed, the criminal jury trial right was protected in both Article III of
the Constitution and the Sixth Amendment because Article III had no
specific promise of the jury trial, and "many Anti-Federalists wanted an
explicit guarantee that juries would be organized around local rather than
statewide communities." 65 From the beginning, then, a key aspect of the
criminal jury trial was the community's role in conveying punishment to
criminal offenders.
Additionally, considering how many Revolutionary-era Americans
deeply distrusted the judicial branch,66 one of the primary reasons for
enshrining the jury as the arbiter of criminal punishment was to ensure that
62 Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON
THE LAWS OF ENGLAND, 343 (1769)).
63 Eric Fleisig-Greene, Note, Why Contempt is Different: Agency Costs and "Petty
Crime" in Summary Contempt Proceedings, 112 YALE L.J. 1223, 1229 (2003).
64 Akhil Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE. L.J. 1131, 1186
(1991). As Amar explains, the jury was central to both the Bill of Rights and the
Constitution: "Not only was it featured in three separate amendments (the Fifth, Sixth,
and Seventh), but its absence strongly influenced the judge-restricting doctrines
underlying three other amendments (the First, Fourth, and Eighth)." Id. at 1190.
65 Id. at 1197.
66 Revolutionary-era Americans' distrust stemmed from their experience with the
British court system and the Stamp Act, among other outrages. See Fleisig-Greene, supra
note 63, at 1230.
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adjudication of crime was never severed from popular authority. 67 Thus the
desire to protect the jury trial cannot be seen merely as a way to incorporate
popular checks and accountability into the justice system, because the jury
trial right guaranteed that the citizenry would have a direct hand in
determining the moral blame of punishment.In responding to the slow diminution of the jury right's traditional and
proper scope, the Blakely Court firmly re-established the paramount territory
of the jury in criminal decision-making and punishment. 68 As sentencing
scholars have noted, the Blakely decision "reflects the need to give
intelligible content to the right of the jury trial."'69 Indeed, it is difficult to
read Blakely without concluding that the Court decided that "the sentencing
revolution, which relied on judge-centered administrative sentencing
procedures, must start granting defendants the full panoply of jury-centered
adversarial procedures." 70
It is possible, of course, to interpret Blakely more narrowly. A more
restrained Blakely reading would only mean that juries must find facts
increasing the "statutory maximum." If the definition of "statutory
maximum" is itself limited to only the actual length of time the offender
spends in prison, as opposed to all the other ancillary sentencing proceedings
that can increase an offender's punishment, then Blakely's scope is
considerably constricted. However, this reading is extremely formalistic,
with little to no underlying theory supporting it. A broader understanding of
Blakely is indicated in both the pre-Blakely line of cases and its progeny.71
Another narrow reading of Blakely, first championed by Douglas
Berman, argues that the jury trial right is not always triggered by the
67 Id. at 1230.
68 As Alschuler, among others, has pointed out, at the time of the founding, juries
often decided the law as well as the facts. Alvin Alschuler & Andrew Deiss, A Brief
History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U. CHI. L. REv. 867, 903 (1994);
Morris B. Hoffman, The Case for Jury Sentencing, 52 DUKE L.J. 951 (2003).
Accordingly, if Blakely's power is partially derived from the jury's original role, then an
extremely broad interpretation of the Sixth Amendment could encompass jury law-
finding. However, the jury's role as a law-finder as well as a fact-finder was on its way
out as early as 1794, and was almost completely gone by 1835. Alschuler, supra, at 907.
In contrast, the jury's role as fact-finder and arbiter of punishment continues to be an
essential part of the Sixth Amendment.
69 Weisberg, supra note 22, at 629 (quoting Rory Little, Excerpts From "The Future
of American Sentencing: A National Roundtable on Blakely, " 2 OHIO ST. J. GRIM. L. 619,
629 (2005)).
70 Berman, supra note 22, at 34-35.
71 1 discuss this further infra Part 1II.
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authorization of punishment based on certain findings. This understanding of
Blakely holds that juries need only determine offense conduct, not offender
characteristics, since offender characteristics do not define a crime and thus
fail to implicate the jury trial right.72 Stated differently, according to this
Blakely interpretation, "the Constitution's jury trial right does not preclude a
judge from making alone those findings concerning offender characteristics
that the law deems relevant to sentencing determinations." 73 This
interpretation also helps clarify the Almendarez-Torres prior conviction
exception, because the fact of a prior conviction goes to the offender's
personal history-an offender characteristic rather than an element of
offense conduct.74
The problem with this interpretation, however, is the difficulty in
distinguishing offense from offender characteristics. 75 Although certain
categories easily sort themselves out into one or the other, such as age,
former employment, or schooling, other areas, such as criminal history,76
rehabilitative promise, and determinations of "future dangerousness" 77 are
mixed, making it difficult to classify as either conduct or characteristic. 78
Indeed, "[1]egislatures and sentencing commissions have an understandable
and perhaps justifiable tendency to define punishment consequences in
diverse, intricate, nuanced and interconnected ways that often will not
facilitate easy offense/offender labeling."79 Accordingly, it is hard to
imagine creating a post-Blakely regime that incorporates such a distinction.
72 Berman, supra note 18, at 90.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 To be fair, Berman acknowledges this. Id.
76 By "criminal history," I mean not only an offender's prior convictions, but also
her juvenile history, narcotics use, prior indictments, foreign crimes, and other
information that often shows up on Pre-Sentencing Reports (PSRs). Although Berman
argues that criminal history falls squarely into "offender" characteristics, see id. at 90-91,
this is not always the case. Although prior convictions normally can be categorized as
offender characteristics, facts such as prior and current drug use, dismissed indictments,
and uncharged crimes can be complicated to determine, and often have great effect on an
offender's sentence.
77 This was specifically mentioned by Berman as troubling. See id. at 91.
78 Berman, on the other hand, argues that criminal history and rehabilitative promise
are only offender-based characteristics, not mixed. In doing so, he over-simplifies the
complex calculations that go into determining these facts, particularly in state sentencing
systems.
79 Berman, supra note 18, at 92.
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Relying on this narrower interpretation of Blakely, Berman argues
further that such mixed categories should be treated as offender
characteristics rather than offense conduct because they "are not really part
of the defendant's 'crimes' and thus are not essential jury issues." 80 But this
kind of analysis just begs the question by reclassifying traditional jury
issues-whether a defendant has obstructed justice, whether a defendant will
be dangerous in the future, etc.-to leave them in the hands of the court.
Stated differently, arguing that mixed categories should be treated as
offender characteristics, and thus determined by the judge, is very similar to
the argument that the Court specifically rejected in Blakely in regards to
reclassifying sentencing factors as elements: "the jury need only find
whatever facts the legislature chooses to label elements of the crime, and
that those it labels sentencing factors---no matter how much they may
increase the punishment--may be found by the judge."81 A broader Blakely
view, on the other hand, avoids this problem by assuming that only the most
basic offender characteristics may be determined by non-jury actors.
Moreover, as Berman himself notes,82 Blakely's relatively broad
language seems to reject such line-drawing---whether between mixed
offender/offense categories or even distinguishing between offense conduct
versus offender characteristics at all. This is particularly true in light of
Cunningham v. California,83 where at least six Justices seem to reject the
offense/offender distinction entirely.84
The broad Blakely mandate stems from the importance the Court
currently places on the role of the jury. The Sixth Amendment's "reservation
of jury power," 85 the "common-law ideal of limited state power,"86 the re-
discovered "Framers' paradigm for criminal justice,"87 and the constitutional
requirement that all facts legally essential to the punishment be proved to a
80 Id. at 91.
81 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 306 (2004).
82 See Berman, supra note 18, at 95 n.18.
83 127 S. Ct. 856 (2007).
84 Id. at 856 ("Justice Kennedy urges a distinction between facts concerning the
offense, where Apprendi would apply, and facts concerning the offender, where it would
not .... Apprendi itself, however, leaves no room for the bifurcated approach .... ." Id
at 869 n.14.). I discuss Cunningham infra Part II.C.
85 Blakely, 542 U.S. at 308.




jury beyond a reasonable doubt 88 combine in Blakely to form a new principle
for sentencing proceedings.
Granted, even with a wide-ranging interpretation of Blakely, it is still
unclear precisely how broad its reading should be. In the most expansive of
readings, a form of jury trial must be available for the determination of every
fact-something even the most ardent supporters of a broad mandate would
find difficult to endorse.89 Accordingly, I would argue that the best way to
understand Blakely's animating principle is as a broad, but not unlimited,
mandate.
Ultimately, by stating that the jury trial right applies to "all facts legally
essential to the punishment," 90 the Court rejects a narrow understanding of
the jury's role. As discussed below, this rejection is confirmed by the post-
Blakely cases.
Such an expanded jury role would also apply to most front- and back-
end sentencing practices, particularly those which increase the criminal
punishment meted out to the offender. As Mark Harris has noted, "Blakely is
a call to all interested parties to think anew about the types of procedures
that befit modem sentencing." 91
C. Steps Further Down the Blakely Path
Since Blakely, the Court has continued to focus on the jury's role in
finding facts that increase or enhance an offender's punishment. This is
particularly true in Shepard, Recuenco, and Cunningham, each of which
contains implications about Blakely's eventual reach.
88 Id. at 313.
89 Many specific Blakely problems in sentencing could be solved by allowing the
jury the opportunity to give its imprimatur of approval to any facts determined by a non-
jury actor, such as a bureaucratic official or the trial court. In other words, after all the
relevant facts have been collected, in whatever form, they should be presented to a
special sentencing jury for either adoption or rejection. This division of labor would
uphold a broader Blakely mandate by involving the jury in every fact that increases an
offender's punishment, while at the same time preserving much of the functioning of the
current criminal justice system.
90 Blakely, 542 U.S. at 313.
91 Mark D. Harris, Blakely's Unfinished Business, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 83, 84
(2004) (addressing Berman's views).
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1. Shepard.
Shepard dealt with a judge's ability to determine certain facts in
weighing an offender's prior conviction. 92 Specifically, the Shepard Court
held that judges must confine their review of evidence concerning prior
convictions to the charging document, the terms of the plea agreement, or the
offender's admissions in an exchange with the trial judge. 93
Most interesting about Shepard, however, was its broader implications
for the future of the prior conviction exception. Shepard implied that the
Court might eliminate this "last remaining exception to the Apprendi... ban
on judicial fact-finding on enhanced sentences."'94 Moreover, Justice
Clarence Thomas, writing separately, argued in his concurrence that the
exception carved out in Almendarez-Torres v. United States had been
continually eroded by the Apprendi-Blakely principles,95 and the exception
should be eliminated for good. 96 Moreover, Shepard supports a narrow
reading of the prior conviction exception articulated in Almendarez-Torres,
where facts related to the prior conviction but not adjudicated in the prior
proceeding would fall outside the prior conviction exception. The majority
in Shepard observed that:
While the disputed fact here can be described as a fact about a prior
conviction, it is too far removed from the conclusive significance of a prior
judicial record, and too much like the findings subject to Jones and
Apprendi, to say that Almendarez-Torres clearly authorizes a judge to
resolve the dispute.9 7
This language limiting Almendarez-Torres to tight confines supports a wider
interpretation of Apprendi-Blakely reasoning; if only a minimum of prior
92 Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 16 (2005).
93 Id. at 26.
94 See Posting of Lyle Denniston to SCOTUSblog,
http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/2005/03/state_prisoners.html (Mar. 7,
2005, 10:09 EST).
95 Shepard, 544 U.S. at 27-28 (Thomas, J., concurring).
961d. at 28 (Thomas, J., concurring). Thomas joined the Almendarez-Torres
majority, but has since said that he "succumbed" to error in joining that ruling. Apprendi
v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 520 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring).
97 Shepard, 544 U.S at 25. Jonathan Soglin at Criminal Appeal first made this point.
See Posting of Jonathan Soglin to Criminal Appeal, http://www.crimblawg.com/
2005/03/thoughtsabout_.html (Mar. 8, 2005, 7:37 EST).
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conviction facts fit into the exception, then all else may be subject to
Blakely.
Shepard is important for a number of reasons, then. First, as others have
noted, a number of "sentencing determinations depend on judicial findings
of prior conviction facts (even in states without guideline systems),
and... many pre-Blakely sentences have been affirmed post-Blakely by
relying on the prior conviction exception," which itself hangs on the
continuing validity of Almendarez-Torres.98 And because most states have
some sort of compulsory recidivism statute on the books, eliminating the
prior conviction exception could have tremendous effect on every state's
sentencing procedures. 99 Second, even if the prior conviction exception
remains, the Shepard Court's expansive language and understanding of
Blakely's predecessors, Jones and Apprendi, combined with Thomas's
concurrence, support an equally expansive understanding of Blakely itself.
2. Recuenco and Harmless Error
Another tantalizing footnote and some broad language from Justice
Thomas in Washington v. Recuenco' °° also suggest a wider scope for
Blakely. Ironically, this language is found in a case which held that it was
harmless error to enhance a sentence enhanced in violation of Blakely.
Recuenco presented the question whether a sentence enhanced in
violation of Blakely's Sixth Amendment principle is amenable to harmless-
error analysis under Chapman v. California,1° 1 or instead constitutes
"structural error."102 The Recuenco Court held that violations of Blakely
rights can be subject to Chapman harmless error analysis, and reversed the
Washington Supreme Court's holding that Blakely violations can never be
harmless.10 3
Granted, Recuenco does limit Blakely's scope in the federal system by
applying harmless-error analysis to its violations. Paradoxically enough,
however, it also suggests the possibilities for future Blakely expansion.
98 Sentencing Law and Policy, http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencinglaw_
and-policy/2005/03/theemshepardem.html (Mar. 7, 2005, 12:11 EST).
99 1 return briefly to the fate of the prior conviction exception infra Part IV.B.2.c.
100 126 S. Ct. 2546 (2006).
101 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
102 See Steven G. Sanders, Is Recuenco Sentencing Case a Big Fat Dud?, NEW
JERSEY LAWYER, Apr. 24, 2006, at 7, available at http://njlonline.com/lawmore.
LawMore 042406.pdf, at 7 (last visited Oct. 11, 2007).
103 Recuenco, 126 S. Ct. at 2553.
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Recuenco included some expansive language about sentencing factors,
language that can be read to extend Blakely principles. 104
For example, the Recuenco majority, drawing on Apprendi, plainly
stated that it has "treated sentencing factors, like elements, as facts that have
to be tried to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt."' 10 5 Thus,
instead of narrowing Apprendi's holding (that "any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be
submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt"106), Recuenco
contended that all sentencing factors were essentially equal to facts.
Likewise, Recuenco specifically discussed Apprendi's recognition that
"elements and sentencing factors must be treated the same for Sixth
Amendment purposes."' 0 7 Both these assertions questioned how a
"sentencing factor" should be defined, leaving plenty of room for Blakely's
further expansion-including, for our purposes, an expansion to ancillary
sentencing procedures. The Recuenco Court's disinclination to limit
Apprendi only to facts that increase the maximum sentence can be seen as a
strong signal that Blakely's extension is not finished.
Moreover, simply because the Court found that constitutional harmless
error doctrine is applicable to Blakely violations does not preclude individual
states from deciding that Blakely violations are not harmless under state
remedial law. Recuenco explicitly acknowledges this possibility in its first
footnote, which notes, "Respondent's argument that, as a matter of state law,
the Blakely v. Washington ... error was not harmless remains open to him
on remand."1 08
Put another way, not only did the Court carefully keep open the option
of states rejecting harmless error analysis for Blakely violations, it also
signaled the importance of state law in the post-Blakely world.10 9 And since
the vast bulk of criminal sentencing happens in the states, not the federal
system, what may be harmless Blakely error under federal constitutional law
104 Thanks to Doug Berman for this point. See Sentencing Law and Policy,
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencinglaw-and_policy/2006/06/a few quick tho.ht
ml (Mar. 7, 2005, 12:11 EST).
105 Recuenco, 126 S. Ct. at 2552.
106 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
107 Recuenco, 126 S. Ct. at 2552.
108 Id. at 2552 n.1.





may still be structural error under state law, again providing a more
expansive definition of Blakely's requirements.
3. Cunningham
Most recently, in Cunningham v. California, the Court reaffirmed the
bright-line rule articulated in Apprendi and Blakely, rejecting California's
attempt to evade Blakely's requirements. The Cunningham Court ruled that
California's sentencing guidelines were flawed because they required
judicial fact-finding to elevate or mitigate a sentence beyond the "middle"
range, facts that must be found by a jury to comply with Blakely and
Booker. 110
The Cunningham majority not only clarified that any judicial fact-
finding presents constitutional problems, but it also contended that the states
which have modified their sentencing systems post-Blakely have done so "by
calling upon the jury--either at trial or in a separate sentencing
proceeding-to find any fact necessary to the imposition of an elevated
sentence."'111 In other words, any fact-finding that increases a sentence from
the punishment arising from the guilty verdict must be found by the jury and
the jury alone. Thus, Cunningham is yet another signal from the Court that
the goals have widened in the sentencing field.
Analyzing the Court's reasoning in its recent sentencing cases, however,
is not the end of the matter. To truly understand the Court's decisions and
future direction, it is critical that we derive a coherent sentencing
jurisprudence-something that has been sorely lacking, for the most part, in
the general scholarly discussion of the Apprendi-Blakely case line.
Accordingly, Part I of this Article begins an exploration of the
jurisprudential currents animating this sentencing revolution, and how these
currents should affect our application of the Blakely doctrine.
[[I. RETRIBUTION AND REDISCOVERY OF THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT JURY RIGHT
In the past several terms, the Court's decisions on sentencing have been
nothing short of revolutionary. Indeed, courts, scholars, and practitioners are
just beginning to come to terms with the new requirements for sentencing
schemes under Blakely and Booker.
110 See Cunningham v. California, 127 S. Ct. 856, 868 (2007).
111 Id. at 871.
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One area that has not been much explored, however, is the
jurisprudential underpinnings of the Court's recent sentencing decisions.
Although there is a general consensus that sentencing jurisprudence has
changed, there is little agreement as to how or why. 112
These underexplored aspects of Blakely.'s punishment philosophy are
extremely important. This is so for two reasons: (1) to help understand how
the Court's sentencing jurisprudence has changed; and (2) to assist in
predicting in which direction this jurisprudence might ultimately lead.
I contend that the line of late twentieth- and early twenty-first-century
sentencing decisions beginning with Jones and culminating-for now-with
Blakely, Shepard, Recuenco, and Cunningham, suggests a new kind of
punishment philosophy, one based on historical/doctrinal reasoning and the
Court's rediscovery of the Sixth Amendment. Although no one theory fits
perfectly, an expressive retributive theory of punishment for sentencing best
supports the Court's underlying jurisprudence-one grounded both in the
historical jury right to decide all punishments and in community decisions
about blameworthiness.
Accordingly, Section A provides a brief overview of the jurisprudence of
American sentencing law. Section B explores how the Court's historical
grounding of Blakely and its rediscovery of the Sixth Amendment jury right
supports a modified retributive jurisprudence of sentencing. In short, I hope
to show how the Court's new theory of criminal sentencing supports
reforming and seriously re-thinking sentencing in general and ancillary
sentencing proceedings in particular.
A. American Sentencing Jurisprudence in Historical Perspective
Over the past thirty years the philosophy underlying criminal sentencing
has been in flux. Although sentencing rules and proceedings have been
changing, no coherent belief structure has been articulated, leading to
inequity and inconsistency in sentencing procedures. As Doug Berman and
Steve Chanenson have argued, "the theories, structures, and procedures for
modem sentencing decision-making have not been seriously rethought
112 Indeed, in their recent article, Doug Berman and Stephanos Bibas note that "the
Court's sentencing jurisprudence is at best confusing, at worst conceptually incoherent."
Douglas A. Berman & Stephanos Bibas, Making Sentencing Sensible, 4 OHIO ST. J.
CmiM. L. 37, 37 (2006).
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following the modem rejection of a now seemingly antiquated rehabilitative
sentencing philosophy.""' 13
The Supreme Court's reasoning in the Blakely line of cases, however,
suggests a new jurisprudential underpinning to sentencing, one that is based
on the Court's reliance and renewed attention to the rights of the jury to
determine all facts affecting punishment. But before we explore the new
jurisprudence underlying the reasoning in Blakely and its predecessors, it is
important to understand what sentencing theory we are leaving behind.
Historically, judicial tolerance of relatively informal, non-adversarial
sentencing proceedings was grounded on the demands of a discretionary and
rehabilitative model of sentencing."l 4 The Court's approval of lax procedural
rights in a discretionary sentencing system, as articulated in Williams v. New
York, 1 5 was expressly premised on the rehabilitative "'medical model' of
sentencing that dominated before modem reforms." 116
By the 1980s, however, the underpinnings of sentencing theory began to
change as both state and federal legislatures began to reform their sentencing
systems and do away with indeterminacy and discretion. 117 Concern about
sentencing arbitrariness and disparity, 1 8 along with a loss of confidence in
correctional rehabilitative programs, 19 motivated much of this change.
Instead of a rehabilitative theory of punishment, norms of deterrence and
incapacitation became the rule, 120 as well as some consequentialist
113 Douglas A. Berman & Steven L. Chanenson, The Real (Sentencing) World: State
Sentencing in the Post-Blakely Era, 4 OHIO ST. J. GRIM. L. 27, 32 (2005).
114 KATE STITH & JOSE CABRANEs, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING GUIDELINES IN
THE FEDERAL COURTS 14 (1973).
115 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
116 Sentencing Law and Policy, http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencinglaw -and
_policy/2005/01/engaging_witht.html (Jan. 19, 2005, 04:13 EST).
117 Michael Tonry, Obsolescence and Immanence in Penal Theory and Policy, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1233, 1236 (2005).
118 See generally MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT
ORDER (1973).
119 Tonry, supra note 117, at 1236.
120 See Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A
Retrospective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1, 11 (2003). As I will explain below, however, I disagree with Tonry's assertion
that retributive ideals were the underpinnings of the sentencing policy changes of the
1970s and early 80s, as well as his conclusion that retributive theories cannot
accommodate the new developments in penal policy. See Tonry, supra note 117, at 1239,
1262. Moreover, because it is so grounded in the community's decision-making process,
an expressive retributive philosophy for sentencing, particularly ancillary sentencing,
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"communicative" theories of punishment, which argued that the aim of
punishment was to communicate with the offender about her wrongdoing.12 1
Such utilitarian norms have held sway until recently.
Once rehabilitation theories of punishment went out of vogue, the
Williams rationale supporting almost complete judicial and probationary
discretion became untenable. The sentencing reform movement rejected
rehabilitation as a penal theory because modem sentencing focused
predominantly on incarceration and imposing punishment, not on devising a
cure. 122 "No one believes anymore that the goal of rehabilitation justifies
totally informal fact-finding procedures."123 As Stephanos Bibas argued:
[I]t made sense to have a judge/jury allocation of authority, when sentencing
was a prospective enterprise of therapeutic assessment ... [b]ut now that
sentencing seems to be primarily a retrospective assignment of blame, the
whole reason for having a second sentencing proceeding that is so trial-like,
and yet is not a trial, is really being called into question. 124
Sentencing, then, has become an adversarial process like any other. 125
There has been little thought about the philosophy that has replaced
rehabilitation, 12 6 however, and that itself is a problem. 12 7 As Norval Morris
observed, "[w]hen a court decides what sentence to impose on a criminal
avoids Tonry's critique that the retributive punishment theories adopted by "[a]
considerable number of serious philosophers" in the 1970s and 80s could not be adopted
in the "real world because they were premised on unrealistic and unattainable
assumptions about social justice and equal life chances." Id. at 1265.
121 Tonry, supra note 117, at 1266.
122 Sentencing Law and Policy, http://sentencing.typepad.comsentencinglaw_
and-policy/2005/0l/engagingwith t.html (Jan. 19, 2005, 04:13 EST).
123 Harris, supra note 91, at 86.
124 Weisberg, supra note 22, at 636-37 (quoting Stephanos Bibas).
125 Harris, supra note 91, at 86.
126 As Berman aptly notes:
The sentencing revolution has been theoretically underdeveloped because it largely
has been a conceptual anti-movement. Many jurisdictions moved to structured
sentencing systems and abolished the institution of parole not in express pursuit of a
new sentencing theory, but rather as simply a rejection of the rehabilitative ideal that
had been dominant for nearly a century.
Berman, supra note 22, at 11.
127 Following in Bibas's path, I am interested in exploring the substantive values




standing convicted before it, it must so decide with reference to some
purpose or purposes, conscious or unconscious, articulate or inarticulate."'128
Although rehabilitation is no longer the primary underlying philosophy
of sentencing, there have been few comprehensive theories of modem
sentencing in its place. I aim to fill this gap. Accordingly, I propose that an
expressive retributive theory of punishment best supports the Court's
rediscovery of the Sixth Amendment jury right in sentencing procedures.
B. Expressive Retribution and the Sixth Amendment
In 2003, prior to Blakely but following Jones, Apprendi, and Ring,
Alschuler presciently argued that "retribution, a seemingly archaic,
backwards-looking goal dismissed by the champions of rehabilitation at one
end of the twentieth century and by the champions of 'crime control' at the
other, merits recognition as the central purpose of criminal punishment."'129
It is this retributive principle that I wish to develop below, because Blakely
and its predecessors rely on an unspoken theory of community-based
retribution that should inform our future understanding of criminal
punishment.
Michael Tonry has observed that penal theory and punishment
philosophy can either be dependent or independent variables-"[t]hey may
cause changes in the world or result from them."' 30 Consequently, we can
better understand the origins of punishment ideas, policies, and practices if
we become more aware about why and when particular ideas and beliefs
become popular. 131 Thus, exploring the Blakely rediscovery of the jury right
in sentencing proceedings is critical in helping us understand why a
retributive theory of sentencing best explains recent sentencing decisions.
Retributive theory is often misunderstood and mischaracterized.
Although a retributivist must believe that imposition of deserved punishment
is an intrinsic good, that is the only proposition to which she commits; she
needn't believe it is the only intrinsic good. 132 This view separates the
128Norval R. Morris, Sentencing Convicted Criminals, 27 AusTL. L.J. 186, 189
(1953).
129 Alschuler, supra note 120, at 15.
130 Tonry, supra note 117, at 1233.
131 Id. at 1234.
132 Alschuler, supra note 120, at 15.
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retributivist from those who believe punishment is an intrinsic evil, such as
Jeremy Bentham.133
A retributivist follows in Kant's steps through her focus upon the moral
appropriateness of individual punishments in relation to the offender's
individual crime.134 Unlike Kant, however, she need not argue that imposing
just punishment is a "categorical imperative"; 135 nor parrot Michael Moore
that the retributivist punishes solely because the offender deserves it;13 6 nor
agree with James Stephen that it is morally correct to hate criminals. 137
Neither must a retributivist stick to the "crude model" of retributive
theory that H.L.A. Hart identifies-that the justification for punishing men is
so the "return of suffering for moral evil voluntarily done, is itself just or
morally good."'1 38 Instead, a retributivist can accept the goal of imposing the
community's sanctions as an intrinsic good that expresses social disapproval,
shapes norms, and creates moral education. 139
Moreover, many retributivists believe in a balancing of burdens as part
of society's role in criminal punishment. 140 Alschuler argued that this kind
133 Bentham argued that "all punishment in itself is evil .... [I]f it ought at all to be
admitted, it ought only to be admitted in as far as it promises to exclude some greater
evil." Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation, in
JEREMY BENTHAM AND JOHN STUART MILL, THE UTILITARIANS 162 (Dolphin 1961).
134 See generally IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE
(1780).
135 "The Penal Law is a Categorial Imperative; and woe to him who creeps through
the serpent-windings of Utilitarianism to discover some advantage that may discharge
him from the Justice of Punishment, or even from the due measure of it .. ." IMMANUEL
KANT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 195 (1887).
136 See Michael S. Moore, The Moral Worth of Retribution, in RESPONSIBILITY,
CHARACTER AND THE EMOTIONS: NEW ESSAYS IN MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 179, 179
(Ferdinand Schoeman ed., 1987).
137 See JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, 2 A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 81 (Macmillan 1883).
138 H.L.A. HART, Responsibility and Retribution, in PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY 210, 231 (1968).
139 1 borrow these ideas from Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of
Desert, 91 Nw. U. L. REv. 453 (1997), which argues that there is a great utility in a
distribution of liability and punishment according to people's shared intuitions of justice,
perhaps greater than the utility of distributing liability and punishment in the traditional
utilitarian manner (to optimize deterrence, rehabilitation, or incapacitation).
140See HERBERT MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE: ESSAYS IN LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY AND MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 34 (1976). Morris argues, among other things,
that people's "disposition to comply voluntarily will diminish as they learn that others are
with impunity renouncing burdens they are assuming."
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of consequential argument for retributivism turns on "how a society
perceives desert rather than on desert itself.' 141
As this line of thought contends, when there are conflicting perceptions
of desert-or moral blameworthiness-democratic processes are most likely
to give the best concept of desert for a polity. 142 Concepts of desert that
emerge from democratic processes will generally be widely shared or
respected. 143 Finally, "recognizing that criminal punishment is not simply an
instrumental good discourages unweighted procedural tradeoffs of the sort
that have characterized the new penology."' 144
More recently, there has been some argument that retribution may be in
ascendance both in academic circles and real-world institutions. 145 In areas
such as the "purposes" section of state criminal codes, the distributive
standard in modem sentencing guidelines, the revision of the Model Penal
Code, and the debate over the death penalty, retributive theory has become a
guiding principle. 146
As H.L.A. Hart argued, "we attach importance to the restrictive principle
that only offenders may be punished."'147 The Supreme Court's new
sentencing jurisprudence attempts to bolster that statement by ensuring that
punishment only goes to those offenders who have been found guilty of any
and every offense they have been charged with by a jury. The critical aspect
of the jury's role in sentencing reflects the importance the Court has placed
on the community-and liberal democratic decision-making-in sentencing
procedures.
Moral judgments still justify criminal punishment and sentencing, as
"the relative gravity of punishments is to reflect moral gravity of
offences."' 148 Accordingly, the level of punishment in retributive theory is
roughly equal to the seriousness of the wrong and the blameworthiness of
the offender in committing it.




145 See Paul H. Robinson, Competing Conceptions of Modem Desert: Vengeful,
Deontological, and Empirical (University of Pennsylvania Public Law & Legal Theory
Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 06-32, 2006), available at http://papers.
ssm.com/abstract=-924917.
146 Id. at 1.
147 H.L.A. HART, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT
AND RESPONSIBILITY 1, 12 (1968).
148 HART, supra note 138, at 234.
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Historically, the jury has determined the blameworthiness of the
offender. The Court's decisions endorsing the right to jury decisions is
equally an endorsement of the jury's determination of who in society is
blameworthy. Thus, retributive justice principles, as applied to sentencing,
can be found in the Court's rediscovery and reaffirmation of the right of the
jury-that is, the polity-to set out all criminal punishment, no matter what
form it may take. This ideal is neither vengeful nor desirous of suffering, 149
but instead allows the community to set out blame for crimes that
specifically affect them. We impose community standards of punishment
with sadness, not "retributive hatred."' 150
Retribution is not only concerned with the offender's past wrongdoing,
of course. "[R]etributivists urge on offenders the maxim that they must take
responsibility for the reasonably foreseeable results of their actions."115'
Specifically, as one scholar has argued, when we punish an offender who
knows or should have known his actions were illegal, "we tell him that his
actions matter to this community constituted by shared laws."'1 52 This
understanding ties neatly into the Court's repeated arguments in its recent
sentencing decisions that the jury must make the decisions on almost all
facts that affect punishment because only a decision made by a fair cross-
section of the community imposes the responsibility of accepting moral
blame onto the offender.
When the judge, instead of the jury, is primarily or solely responsible for
doling out the moral blame of punishment, offenders may not feel
responsible for their actions, because the kind and type of punishment-the
sentence-is so far attenuated from the community. When the judge
determines sentencing facts, the offender may very well attribute his
punishment to the State and shrug off the desired feelings of responsibility or
awareness of his wrongdoing. In contrast, when the jury determines
sentencing facts, the wrongdoer has more difficulty avoiding the burden of
criminal responsibility, because his fellow citizens, his community, and his
peers have pronounced his blameworthiness-as signified by the weight and
heft of his sentence.
149 Extreme versions of retributive theory justify punishment as a moral good in
return for the suffering for moral evil voluntarily done. See id. at 234-35.
150 See Jeffrie G. Murphy, Hatred: A Qualified Defense, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY &
JEAN HAMPTON, FoRGIVENESS AND MERCY 88 (1988).
151 Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. REv. 1421, 1442-43 (2004).
152 Id. at 1445. Markel posits that retribution instantiates, as a socio-legal practice,
an ideal of individual moral accountability in the course of explicating a confrontational
conception of retribution. See id.
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As a distributive principle, retributive justice supports the Court's new
sentencing jurisprudence, since every time the offender commits a crime, she
undermines the sovereign will of the people by challenging their decision-
making structure. 153 Because criminal laws in liberal democracies reflect a
democratic pedigree of criminal laws, crimes are expressions of superiority
to the state and the community. 154 By involving the will of the people during
the sentencing and punishment phase through the incorporation of the jury,
the Court helps offset the unfairness the offender created in the community.
In the Court's new allegiance to the criminal jury trial right in
sentencing, any imbalance and attack against the will of the people is
balanced by the requirement that the jury find all elements of the crimes
alleged, thereby deciding on punishment. If retribution communicates
directly to offenders, 155 then it is a communication from the community to
the wrongdoer.
Retribution can be a rather blunt instrument to indiscriminately apply to
all of modem sentencing, however. There have historically been a number of
objections to retribution, including its harshness, its preference for prisons,
its immorality, its impracticality, and its vagueness, among others. 156 In
response, Paul Robinson has recently contended that there are at least three
distinct conceptions of desert-vengeful, deontological, and empirical-and
an accurate assessment of retribution as a distributive principle requires that
each of these concepts be distinguished. 157
As applied to sentencing reform, Robinson's conception of empirical
desert proves most useful. Robinson defines empirical retribution as a
distributive principle focusing on the blameworthiness of the offender, but
assessing punishment based on the community intuitions of justice. 158 The
primary source of this principle is derived from empirical research into what
drives people's intuitions of blameworthiness. 159
15 31d. at 1449. See also JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW 124 (1990).
154 Markel, supra note 151, at 1453.
155 Id. at 1465.
156 Robinson, supra note 145, at 4.
157 Id. at 4-5. Robinson defines vengeful desert as requiring that the punishment be
proportionate to the harm caused, deontological desert as focused on the
blameworthiness of the offender, and empirical desert as focused on the blameworthiness
of the offender but relying on the community's intuitions of justice for punishment. Id. at
5, 7, 8.
158 Id. at 8.
159 Id.
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Notably, however, it is not the community's view of deserved
punishment in a specific case that drives empirical retribution, but instead a
"set of liability and punishment rules" that applies identically to all
defendants. 160 Empirical desert does not seek to explore "true" moral
blameworthiness, but instead relies on the community's shared intuitions
about assigning blameworthiness. 161
The benefit of an empirical desert theory is strongest when you look to
the practical consequences. 162 As Robinson contends:
If the criminal law tracks the community's intuitions of justice in assigning
liability and punishment ... the law gains access to the power and efficiency
of stigmatization, it avoids the resistance and subversion inspired by an
unjust system, it gains compliance by prompting people to defer to it as a
moral authority in new or grey areas... and it earns the ability to help shape
of powerful societal norms. 163
If the criminal law can only truly shape norms if it commands moral
respect, 164 then using empirical desert as a framework for modem sentencing
simultaneously pays tribute to the Court's understanding of historical jury
rights and the practical implications of locating the arbiters of moral
blameworthiness within the offender's community.
Criminal law plays a key role in creating and sustaining the moral
consensus needed for maintaining social norms in our diverse society. 165
Thus the jury, as representative of the community, must play a part in all
sentencing punishments because this community determination of social
160 Id. Because empirical desert relies on a general set of community-dictated
liability and punishment rules, instead of individual, ad hoc determinations of
punishment, this partially responds to the problem of bias when relying on the
community to hand down punishment at sentencing. Until quite recently, the American
jury was biased against racial and sexual minorities, women, and the foreign-bom, and
some would argue that the jury is still not free of discriminatory intent. By relying on
general community-created rules to impose punishment, however, it becomes harder for
any specific jury to impose excess punishment on a particular offender for discriminatory
reasons. However, this still does not resolve the problem of immoral intuitions, which
needs the impact of deontological desert to ensure true justice. See id. at 15.
161 Id. at 11.
162 Robinson, supra note 145, at 11.
16 3 Id. at9.
164 See Joseph E. Kennedy, Making the Crime Fit the Punishment, 51 EMORY L.J.
753, 838 (2002).
165 Robinson, supra note 145, at 13.
[Vol. 68:13071334
RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
norms "may be the only society-wide mechanism that transcends cultural and
ethnic differences."' 66
Combined with this conception of empirical desert, Jean Hampton's
understanding of retributive theory provides a strong normative framework
that fits the ideals and doctrine of the Court's new sentencing regime.
Hampton's "expressive" theory of retribution, 167 which explores the
wrongfulness of public conduct and the response that is retribution, 168 posits
that although all wrongful actions violate a moral standard, some moral
actions violate those standards in a way that also affronts the victim's value
or dignity. 169 To say someone has value, Hampton argues, is to invoke
certain conceptions of human worth, specifically highlighting an egalitarian
theory. 170
Drawing on a Kantian theory of human value, Hampton finds people's
worth related to their very humanity, allowing each person an equal moral
worth insofar as each person is an autonomous, rational being.171 In essence,
Hampton posts a "democratic conception of value" to underlie the "moral
respect" crucial to her expressive retributive theory. 172
The "Kantian conception of value,"'173 rooted in Judeo-Christian
tradition, has been extremely influential in modem Western societies, thus
playing a role in "setting the normative standards for acceptable treatment of
166 Id.
167 Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of
Retribution, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1659, 1659 (1992).
168 Id. at 1661, 1665.
169 Id. at 1666.
170 Id. at 1668. Hampton explicates and relies upon Kant's theory of moral worth to
base her theory of retribution. See id. at 1668-69. A full discussion of Kant and his
theory of either retribution or moral theory is well beyond the reach of this paper. As
such, I invoke Kant only to explain Hampton's theory, and neither endorse nor disagree
with her interpretation.
171 Id. Hampton further maintains that "moral respect is based on our intrinsic value
as ends, which all of us have equally .... On this view, morality demands of each of us
that we respect the dignity of others and of ourselves .... Id. at 1668.
172 Id.
173 Hampton, supra note 167, at 1669. As Hampton understands the phrase, it is "a
generic term, subsuming a number of different species of theories of value." Id. at 1672.
As Hampton notes, each of these theories have in common a belief that "human value is
intrinsic, equal, and 'permanent' in the sense that our value cannot be degraded or
lowered by any kind of action." Id. I follow Hampton's general understanding of the
phrase, and do not seek to explore here the different meanings of "value" that may exist
for individual theorists.
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people in our society."' 174 This egalitarian theory of moral worth has always
been implicit (and sometimes explicit) in American conceptions of the polity
and the state.
It is this undercurrent of democracy and egalitarianism that makes
Hampton's understanding of retributivism particularly appropriate for a new
jurisprudence of sentencing, because the Court so heavy relies upon the
democratic principles animating the institution of the criminal jury. Such an
egalitarian theory of worth, of course, is a normative theory, a "part of a
culture's normative practices, animating its ethics and its punitive
system."1 75
As Hampton contends, when we behave in a "wrongful" manner, we are
expressly failing to conform to society's understanding of acceptable
behavior; either by doing acts that are conventionally seen as wrong, or by
expressing defiance of that acceptable behavior. 176 Importantly, "[i]t is
because behavior can carry meaning with regard to human value that it can
be wrongful."'177 Essentially, a person is "morally injured" when she is
targeted by behavior that is interpreted by her cultural community as
diminishing her value. 178
We care about what people say via their actions, good or bad, because
we are deeply concerned over whether our intrinsic value, and the intrinsic
value of others, will garner society's-and specifically, our community's-
respect. 179 When wrongful actions are committed, they not only
misrepresent our value and reduce the entitlements which follow from that
value, but also "threaten[] to reinforce belief in the wrong theory of value by
the community."' 180 It makes sense that the imposition of sanctions and moral
blame upon the wrongdoer should be imposed by the jury, an egalitarian
cross-section of that very same cultural and actual community.
According to our historical ideals of criminal justice and equality, the
jury must determine the scope of the punishment to be visited on the
offender. It offends our bedrock notions of equality when a wrongdoer, by
her actions, represents herself as superior to the rest of the community. This
is not because she is a "free rider," and in the words of Herbert Morris, "got
174 Id. at 1669.
175 Id. at 1667.
176 Id. at 1670.
177 Id.
178 Id.




something for nothing,"'181 but because she has gotten ahead in ways
"inegalitarian and disrespectful" to the community. 182 The jury is the best
way to restore corrective fairness and destroy this inegalitarian belief system
that, if left intact, would continue to injure the community.
Restoring fairness and equalizing the community are important
components of restorative justice, which also plays a part in the
community's role as arbiter of punishment. Restorative justice envisions
crime as "a violation of people and relationships that creates obligations to
make things right."' 183 The restorative theory of punishment conceptualizes
justice as a process that incorporates both the community and the offender in
an attempt to repair and reconcile the harm done. 184
Although many have characterized restorative and retributive theories of
justice as polar opposites, both theories have much in common: "a desire to
vindicate by some-type of reciprocal action and some type of proportional
relationship between the criminal act and the response to it."1 85 In fact, an
expressive retributive theory of punishment, such as I promote here, borrows
from restorative justice in that it is deeply concerned with "the repair of the
material and emotional harms"' 186 that criminal behavior inflicts. By using
the jury as the adjudicator of the harm and determinant of punishment,
expressive restorative retribution focuses on the community's role in
maintaining the egalitarian nature of our society.
American normative theories of democracy and democratic deliberation
have always included the participation of the jury as part of our system of
criminal justice. If you accept that conceptions of egalitarian moral worth are
part of our culture's normative values, 187 and have therefore set the
181 HERBERT MORRIS, Persons and Punishment, in ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE,
ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY AND MORAL PSYCHOLOGY 31-58 (1976).
182 Hampton, supra note 167, at 1681.
183 David Dolinko, The Theory and Jurisprudence of Restorative Justice, 2003
UTAH L. REV. 319, 319 (internal quotation marks omitted).
184 See id. at 319-20.
185 Mark S. Umbreit, Betty Vos, Robert B. Coates & Elizabeth Lightfoot,
Restorative Justice in the 21st Century: A Social Movement Full of Opportunities and
Pitfalls, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 251, 257 (2005) (discussing Conrad Brunk). Although Brunk
argues that the two theories differ in "how to make things right," he envisions retributive
justice as primarily focused on imposing pain. Id. As I discuss, however, an expressive
retributive theory of punishment is primarily focused on equalizing the harm done to the
community, rather than simply penalizing the offender.
186 Dolinko, supra note 183, at 338.
187 Hampton, supra note 167, at 1668.
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normative standards for acceptable treatment of people in our society, 88
then juries must be part of the determination of punishment because the jury
is the most effective tool with which to impose the normative judgment of
the community onto the wrongdoers. The "Kantian, egalitarian theory of
worth implicit in American political values"'189 is best implemented through
the jury, an egalitarian representation of the community and the state.
Even preceding Blakely, some scholars argued that, in the absence of
wide consensus on sentencing goals, it was best to leave sentencing
decisions to a deliberative democratic institution such as the jury. 190 The
role of the jury is so important because the use of the jury allows for a
greater communal voice in sentencing. 191 Jury involvement in sentencing
increases the legitimacy of sentencing punishment because the punishment
for each offense is linked directly to the will of the community. 192
Post-Blakely, the Court's interest in, and dedication to, the jury's right to
decide all facts that increase punishment is, in certain ways, an expressive
approach to the rights and needs of the community; it relies upon the
"citizenry's moral representative"I 93
-the jury-to express the community's
condemnation of the act and re-establish the victim's unfairly reduced value.
This is not for purposes of revenge, however, but to restore the victim and
the offender to their normal places within the community.
Hampton's theory of expressive retribution fits well with the Court's
recent requirement that the jury determine sentencing facts, because only
through jury determination of punishment can the original retributive goals
of the Framers-apportioning blame and societal punishment-be achieved.
Although the Framers disagreed about many things, they concurred with
Blackstone's estimation of the criminal jury, which ensured that no one
received criminal punishment unless a group of ordinary citizens agreed. 194
188 Id.
189 Id. at 1669.
190 See Jenia Iontcheva, Jury Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 VA. L. REV.
311 (2003).
191 See id. at 316 (celebrating the "democratic virtues" of jury involvement in
sentencing).
192 See id.
193 Hampton, supra note 167, at 1694.
194 See Rachel Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury's Constitutional
Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 34 (2003). As Barkow
notes, "even before the Sixth Amendment guaranteed 'the right to... an impartial jury,'




Ultimately, a framework of expressive restorative retribution
encompasses both the historical antecedents of the Sixth Amendment jury
right and modem ideals of punishment. Revisiting retributive theory with an
open eye to its contours can "show that it is bound up with our best
understanding of how individuals and communities live well together."'195
Despite the arguments of critics over the years, retributive theory has a
liberal democratic nature.1 96 As such, it is the best suited to explain, on a
more philosophical level, the Court's recent sentencing reforms.
IV. ANCILLARY SENTENCING IN BLAKELY'S WAKE .
The link between expressive retribution and ancillary sentencing is not
obvious, and punishment theory has been used infrequently in the under-
conceptualized area of sentencing. When expressive restorative retribution is
applied to ancillary sentencing proceedings, however, the framework permits
the community, via the jury, to hand down punishment and moral
opprobrium to their fellow citizens.
Not only does expressive empirical retribution give the community a
voice and help foster egalitarian and democratic ideals, it also forces
offenders to take more responsibility for their wrongdoings, since the
community is involved in the imposition of punishment and restoring the
balance disturbed by the offender's bad acts. This type of community
involvement is the much-needed step that has long been missing from our
post-prison punishments.
A. Reribution as a Guidepost for Ancillary Sentencing
With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that utilitarian theories of
jurisprudence for sentencing offenders were unsuccessful, particularly when
it came to such hidden sentences as parole, probation, and post-release
supervision. Rehabilitation, deterrence, and incapacitation all failed in their
individual ways. Rehabilitation's loose procedural standards left too much
arbitrary discretion at the hands of judges and correction officials. Neither
deterrence nor incapacitation has done much to help fix the problem of
recidivism, despite the complicated supervisory periods tacked on to most
offenders' sentences.
With expressive restorative retribution as a philosophy of punishment,
however, a concrete policy of community involvement and participation can
195 Markel, supra note 151, at 1430.
196 Id. at 1431.
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help structure ancillary sentencing, giving guidance to not only the players in
the criminal justice system, but hopefully the legislative and executive
branches as well.
There is a strong need for community sanctions, involvement, and
support for any sort of post- or out-of-prison punishment to properly work. If
such punishments were grounded in the community-if released offenders
had to serve their parole or post-release supervision in the very community
they had harmed-it is possible that they would feel more culpability for
their transgressions. Moreover, the community itself would be able to feel
restored to its original state through the visible imposition of punishment on
wrongdoers who had injured it. Finally, community sanctions provide a
measure of restorative justice for both the victims and the community. In that
way, parole, probation and post-release supervision can all be seen as critical
parts of expressive retributive philosophy translated into the real world.
There are a variety of ways that expressive restorative retribution could
be incorporated into ancillary sentencing proceedings. For example, in pre-
sentence proceedings, such as pre-sentence reports and persistent violent
felony offender statutes, the community could be directly involved in
deciding which facts should be relevant to increase sentences-that is, which
facts are so problematic to the offender's society that it is necessary to
impose extra punishment on her. Likewise, with post-prison ancillary
sentences, such as parole, post-release supervision, and restitution, the
community could become directly involved in determining what local
aspects of punishment should be imposed, whether community service, time
in a local half-way house, drug and alcohol abuse counseling, or the like.
For example, Jeremy Travis has proposed drawing heavily on the
resources of the community, including families, local employers, and
churches, to help better integrate the community into ancillary sentencing
proceedings.' 97 Travis suggests creating an entity to oversee all community
supervision in each area.
[The entity] would act on behalf of the criminal justice system .... [It
would] oversee the transition period of returning prisoners .... [And it
would] leverage the assets and risks of the community, acting in a problem-
solving mode to achieve the outcomes of adherence to conditions of
supervision, crime prevention generally, and reintegration of offenders,
particularly those returning from prison. 19 8
197 Jeremy Travis, Senior Fellow, The Urban Institute, Thoughts on the Future of




The entity's officials would live and work in the community to avoid the
common problem of distance and attenuation. This could be an ancillary
sentencing version of the community policing model, which would involve
the community in concrete problem-solving activities to help re-integrate
offenders back into society.
Similarly, a specific transition team could be created for each supervised
releasee. As explained by the Re-Entry Policy Council, "[t]ransition
planning team members will vary, depending on the situation of the person
approaching release, but could include representatives of the institution,
community corrections, human service agencies, community-based services,
housing providers, local law enforcement, and the court system-in addition
to advocates for the victim and family members."' 199 New York, Missouri,
Tennessee, Florida, and Maryland are among the states that currently have a
community transition team in place for offenders with ancillary sentences. 200
Another possibility involving the community in ancillary sentencing
proceedings is faith-based programming. For example, the Ohio Department
on Rehabilitation and Corrections has recently begun to investigate the
possibility of using pastoral community members to work with those
offenders on supervised release.20 1 Although using faith-based community
initiatives must be carefully squared with First Amendment requirements, it
also permits societal input into ancillary sentencing.
Because it is the local community that interacts with the offender on the
most frequent basis, under a theory of expressive retribution, it is important
to get the community's imprimatur on the length and heft of any ancillary
punishments. The community's role in imposing punishment cannot end at
the courthouse steps.
There is tremendous potential in applying the lessons of expressive
retribution to the world of ancillary sentencing. There are a variety of ways
in which the community can become more involved with punishment of
released offenders, and ancillary sentencing proceedings offer us a wealth of
possibilities. If we accept that our system of incarceration and punishment is
deeply flawed when it comes to preventing recidivism, 20 2 then we should be
199 REENTRY POLICY COUNCIL, REPORT OF THE RE-ENTRY POLICY COUNCIL 346
(2003), available at www.reentrypolicy.org/reentry/Report/Download
200 Id. at 360-64, 389.
201 Thanks to Doug Berman for pointing this out.
2 0 2 See JEREMY TRAVIS, URBAN INSTITUTE, BEYOND THE PRISON GATES: THE STATE
OF PAROLE IN AMERICA (2002), http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310583
Beyond_prisongates.pdf; Amy Solomon, Does Parole Supervision Work?, URBAN
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willing to extend the philosophy of expressive retribution from these pages
to the streets. Blakely has given us the tools to do so.
Following Blakely, our neglect of ancillary sentencing proceedings may
finally end. It is long past time that the criminal procedure revolution that so
galvanized the adjudication stage of the criminal trial now be applied to all
aspects of criminal sentencing. Broadening the reach of Blakely to include
ancillary sentencing is one way to do so.
B. Ancillary Sentencing in Theory and Practice
If sentencing has generally been relegated to the bottom of criminal
scholarship, ancillary sentencing proceedings have been almost entirely
ignored. As Kate Stith and Jose Cabranes have observed: "[e]verything else
that might relate to just punishment-the character, history, and motivation
of the offender, the particular circumstances of the crime, relevant social and
culture needs-has been relegated to sentencing, the back-end of the
criminal justice process." 20 3
American sentencing itself encompasses a variety of punishments. The
"muddy and complicated realities of multi-actor sentencing systems" 20 4
include the length of incarceration, prison selection, in-prison punishments,
post-release supervision, community service, rehabilitative programming,
reports on the offender before sentencing, and restitution. Sometimes they
are determined by the court, sometimes the state legislatures, sometimes the
parole board or department of corrections. 20 5
What all of these proceedings have in common is the potential to
enhance an offender's sentence and a lack of jury input, the only body
constitutionally permitted to increase an offender's punishment. Therefore,
many of these ancillary sentencing procedures may violate the animating
principles of Blakely.
INSTIIUTE, Spring 2006, http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/1000908_parole_
supervision.pdf.
203 STTH & CABRANEs, supra note 114, at 22.
204 Kevin Reitz, Modeling Discretion in American Sentencing Systems, 20 LAW &
POL'Y 389, 393 (1998).
205 See, e.g., Jon Wool, Aggravated Sentencing: Blakely v. Washington, Legal
Considerations for State Sentencing Systems, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 134 (2004).
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The Blakely majority viewed its decision as "a ringing defense of our
adversarial system of justice and the jury's populist role," 206 ensuring that
sentencing was rooted in a community judgment of blame and stigma, while
requiring rigorous procedural fairness to link punishment to each element of
the crime.207 Stated differently, Blakely found that before the community can
brand someone as a specific kind of criminal offender, the jury must
authorize the particular punishment for each and every element of the
crime. 208 Applying this reasoning to ancillary sentencing, there are more
than a few procedures that become, at minimum, questionable.
Accordingly, below I explore the effect of Blakely on a range of front-
and back-end sentencing procedures, beginning with pre-sentencing
proceedings and ending with post-release supervision. I include six types of
proceedings: (1) pre-sentence reports;209 (2) persistent felony offender
enhancement schemes; 210 (3) probation; (4) parole; (5) post-release
supervision; and (6) restitution. 211 As a general rule, none of the facts
determined in these ancillary sentencing proceedings are proven to the jury
beyond a reasonable doubt. In fact, most of the time these facts are not even
determined by courts, but instead by "a veritable parade of actors,
including.., police officers, prosecutors,. . . trial judges," 212  parole
officers, department of corrections officials and probation departments. "All
of these people guide and constrain the sentencing process." 213
Additionally, many of these proceedings have minimal procedural due
process,214 often making them arbitrary and hard to appeal. In fact, because
guilty pleas comprise 95% of all criminal adjudications, often the sentencing
206 Stephanos Bibas, The Blakely Earthquake Exposes the Procedure/Substance




209 Pre-sentencing reports are usually created by the probation department or
department of corrections.
2 10 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.10 (McKinney 2004 & Supp. 2007).
211 1 focus on these six punishments because they are most common- among the fifty
states, and because they have the greatest impact on convicted offenders both in and out
of prison.
212 Steven L. Chanenson, Guidance From Above and Beyond, 58 STAN. L. REV.
175, 175 (2005).
213 Id.
214 Although the due process requirements for post-Blakely sentencing are still an
open question, it is outside the scope of this Article.
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proceedings are the only "trial-like" procedures that an offender
experiences. 215
.My conclusions stem in part from ancillary sentencing data collected
from ten representative states: California, Connecticut, Florida, Illinois,
Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, Texas, Virginia, and Washington. Where
I discuss a particular state's statutes or rules for an example, I cite the
specific statute for easier reference. I rely on this data in part to better
explain what procedures I am discussing, and in part to get a sense of how
states differ in their treatment of convicted offenders, both before and after
the verdict, and how full implementation of Blakely's mandate might change
these proceedings. My purpose is not to single out one or more states for
either good or bad practices. Instead, I hope to give specific examples of why
integrating Blakely's dictates into these hidden state sentencing proceedings
is necessary.
Although considerable effort and ink has been expended on Booker and
the fate of the federal guidelines, much less attention has been paid to
Blakely's effect on state sentencing regimes. 216 This disregard of state
sentencing is unfortunate, because not only does Blakely itself concern state
law, but its particular focus on state implications and lessons is vital. 217
1. A Brief History ofAncillary Sentencing
Many ancillary sentencing proceedings came into being haphazardly.
Although they can greatly affect the offender's sentence and punishment,
they have too often been part of the hidden costs of sentencing. Therefore,
before exploring how Blakely's principles might apply to these procedures,
we should review the history of ancillary sentencing proceedings and policy.
The American penitentiary system began to take shape in the mid-
eighteenth century, continuing its transformation throughout the nineteenth
215 Berman & Bibas, supra note 5, at 49.
216 Some notable exceptions to this rule exist, however. See, e.g., Berman & Bibas,
Making Sentencing Sensible, supra note 5; Berman, Conceptualizing Blakely, supra note
18; Douglas A. Berman, Beyond Blakely and Booker: Pondering Process, 95 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 653 (2005); Berman & Chanenson, The Real (Sentencing) World, supra
note 113; Chanenson, Guidance From Above and Beyond, supra note 212; Steven L.
Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 EMORY L. J. 377 (2005); Harris,
supra note 91; J.J. Prescott & Sonja Starr, Improving Criminal Jury Decision Making
After Blakely, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 301; Kevin Reitz, The New Sentencing Conundrum:
Policy and Constitutional Law at Cross-Purposes, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1082 (2005);
Wool, supra note 205.
2 17Weisberg, supra note 22, at 634.
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century.218 Benjamin Franklin and the Quakers originally conceived of the
penitentiary as a place to literally do (solitary) penance. Most prisons,
however, were not significantly affected by the nineteenth-century
reformatory movement, and remained dark, dangerous and dirty places. 219
At the end of the nineteenth century, parole boards were created to
provide expert advice to sentencing and corrections decisionmakers. 220
Guidelines for parole arrived when the administrative state moved to more
bureaucratic law-making. 221 Finally, the corrections world developed further
with the creation of sentencing commissions and sentencing guidelines. 222
Judicial discretion in sentencing really only came into being with the
nineteenth-century introduction of indeterminate sentencing systems.223
Under these systems, courts could impose sentences as they wished, within
wide statutory ranges of time, considering all sorts of information, and
unimpeded by procedural or evidentiary limitations. 224 In short, with such
free-ranging judicial discretion, criminal sentences became almost entirely
un-reviewable. Not only did appellate courts lack general authority over
sentences, but a sentencing order also typically contained no findings of fact
and no rulings of law to review.225
At the same time, conditional release from prison-or parole-became a
critical part of indeterminate sentencing.226 Probation also became an
"essential component" of the wide discretion given to criminal justice
officials. 227
Both practices had their problems: "probation became more of a
supplement to incarceration than an alternative to it," and parole procedures
were "arbitrary to a fault. '228 Supervision on either parole or probation was
218 See Matthew Meskell, Note, An American Resolution: The History of Prisons in
the United States from 1777 to 1877, 51 STAN. L. REv. 839 (1999).
219 Edgardo Rotman, The Failure of Reform, in THE OxFoRD HISTORY OF THE
PRISON 175 (Norval Morris & David Rottman eds., 1995).
220 See Weisberg, supra note 22, at 634 (citing Jonathan Wroblewski); Rotman,
supra note 219, at 182.
221 Weisberg, supra note 22, at 634 (citing Jonathan Wroblewski).
222 Id.
223 Harris, supra note 91, at 4.
224 Id.
225 Id.
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minimal, as untrained officers with heavy caseloads were unable to assist or
follow up on released prisoners.229 The officers did, however, have power to
revoke probation or parole without a trial or much due process.230 Thus,
from its very beginning, there was little oversight of ancillary sentencing
procedures.
For example, in 1881, one of the earliest general indeterminate
sentencing and parole laws was passed in New York.231 In it, courts did not
fix or limit the duration of a sentence once a defendant was convicted of a
crime. 232 Instead, the "managers of the reformatory" had complete control of
the duration of every term within the limitation of the maximum statutory
term for the convicted crime.233 Likewise, Massachusetts established the
nation's first probation law in 1878.234
There was no central state authority controlling or directing prisons,
however. Even the few states that had boards and agencies to issue
recommendations made them "little more than advisory," with no power to
enforce their decrees.235
Other states also adopted systems that provided for indeterminate terms
of imprisonment for crimes, set by either the legislature or the courts, and
established the first parole authorities. 236 In 1907, New York became the
first state to formally adopt all of the components of a parole system, which
included "indeterminate sentences, a system for granting release, post release
supervision, and specific criteria for parole revocation. 237  Both
indeterminate sentencing and parole became common in the states. 238
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 114, at 18.
232 Id.
233 Id.
234 Daniel Macallair, The History of the Presentence Investigation Report, CENTER
ON JUVENILE AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE, www.cjcj.org/pubs/psi/psireport.html (last visited
Oct. 30, 2007).
235 Rotman, supra note 219, at 171.
236 STITH & CABRANEs, supra note 114, at 18.





Parole was strongly linked to rehabilitative philosophy.239 Parole was
seen as "providing a structured transition between the tight confines of
prison and life without restrictions in the open community .... [O]fficers
supervised parolees and provided guidance and rehabilitative services. 240
By 1942, all of the states had parole systems in place. 241
Federal prisons officially emerged in the last decade of the nineteenth-
century.242 Leavenworth was the first federal prison to be built, with
construction beginning in 1897.243 Likewise, Congress established an
official system of federal parole in 1910.244 The introduction of parole had
the significant effect of reducing federal judicial authority over the length of
prison sentences because "parole authorities, not judges, would determine
each federal prisoner's actual release date." 245
Starting in 1925, a federal judge could also place defendants on
probation. 246 If a convicted federal defendant violated probation, the court
could order him confined for up to the maximum term of his suspended
sentence. 247 Once imprisoned, the convicted federal defendant was at the
mercy of the parole commissioners, who served fixed terms.248 Thus, as
sentencing and post-sentencing procedures moved away from the jury and
towards either courts or parole boards, there was little oversight or due
process-something still true in today's ancillary sentencing proceedings.
At the turn of the twentieth century, then, there was still no substantive
law of sentencing, and a "frankly therapeutic model was in effect. '249 This
sentencing freedom went hand in hand with the abolition of jury sentencing;
"many states that had relied on jury sentencing also abolished or sharply
curtailed this practice."2 50
239 Thomas J. Bamonte, The Viability of Morrisey v. Brewer and the Due Process
Rights of Parolees and Other Conditional Releasees, 18 S. ILL. U. L.J. 121, 125 (1993).
240 Id.
241 PETERSILIA, supra note 237, at 58.
242 Rotman, supra note 219, at 186.
243 Id.
244 STrITH & CABRANES, supra note 114, at 18.
245 Id. at 19.
246 Macallair, supra note 234.
247 STITH & CABRANEs, supra note 114, at 19.
248 Id. at 19-20.
249 Rotman, supra note 219, at 169.
250 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 114, at 18.
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The early parts of the twentieth century also saw the birth of the pre-
sentence report (PSR), "[c]onsidered among the most important documents
in the criminal justice field. 251 The initial purpose of the PSR was to give
the court comprehensive information on the defendant's personal history and
criminal conduct so as to better facilitate individualized sentencing.252
Giving the court the offender's history, the theory went, would permit judges
to tailor sentences to the offender's rehabilitative and reintegrative needs. 253
As such, the PSR usually contained a summary of the offense, the offender's
role, prior criminal justice involvement, and a social history "with an
emphasis on family history, employment, education, physical and mental
health, financial condition and future prospects. 254
Rehabilitation held sway until the early 1970s, when the theory rapidly
fell out of favor. 255 In the beginning of that decade, indeterminate sentencing
was extremely prevalent,256 statutes rarely did more than define crimes and
set maximum penalties, 257 mandatory penalties were minimal, 258 prosecutors
had great charging and plea-bargaining power,259 judges had immense
discretion in setting sentences,260 and parole boards had essentially
unchallenged authority. 261 These punishment practices reflected a utilitarian,
rehabilitative theory of sentencing, an underlying belief system then widely
shared by jurists, practitioners, and academics. 262
Although there is no one definitive reason for rehabilitation's decline,
there are some factors that helped lead the way to less discretionary
sentencing systems. Some of the reasons for rehabilitation's decline in




255 But see Daniel M. Filler & Austin E. Smith, The New Rehabilitation, 91 IOWA L.
REV. 951 (2005) (arguing that rehabilitative goals remain vibrant in many juvenile
courts).






262 See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and Prosecutorial Power: A
Critique of Recent Proposals for "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA. L.
REV. 550, 552 (1978).
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popularity can be traced to studies showing poor results from rehabilitative
efforts already in place.263 These studies undermined correctional
rehabilitative programs on both ethical and empirical grounds. 264
Such empirical "proof' of rehabilitation's failure, combined with Marvin
Frankel's highly influential book, Criminal Sentencing: Law without
Order,265 created a climate in which the absolute discretion of the judge and
the corrections official began to seem suspect. In particular, Frankel's book
highlighted and consolidated a growing concern over arbitrariness and
disparity in sentencing.266 As Norval Morris noted as early as 1953:
[W]ithin this wide discretion left to the courts to determine the appropriate
punishment for crime they have failed to develop any agreed principles or
practices and ... consequently judicial sentencing lacks uniformity and
equality of application, is considerably capricious, and can be shown to fit
neither the crime nor the criminal. 267
Both philosophy and policy began to change accordingly.
As a result, guidelines were introduced for sentencing, parole, charging,
and bargaining, mandatory minimum sentences were reintroduced,
discretionary parole release was limited, and even some plea bargaining was
abolished. 268 Meanwhile, concerned about the unpredictable, disparate
sentencing created by wholly discretionary sentencing systems, many
reformers advocated getting rid of the then-current sentencing model in favor
of more formalized guidelines.269 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, a
majority of state legislatures passed sentencing guidelines limiting judicial
and correctional facility discretion. 270
263 See, e.g., ROBERT MARTINSON, WHAT WORKS--QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS
ABOUT PRISON REFORM 23-24 (1974).
264 Tonry, supra note 117, at 1236.
265 MARVIN FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973).
266 See generally id.
267 Morris, supra note 128, at 186.
268 Tonry, supra note 117, at 1235.
269 Berman, supra note 10, at 7.
270 For example, Florida's sentencing guidelines first became effective in 1983. See
FLA. JUR. 2d § 2270. The Maryland guidelines became effective in 1981. See Richard
Frase, Sentencing Guidelines in Minnesota, Other Statutes and the Federal Courts: A
Twenty-Year Retrospective, 12 FED. SENT'G REP. 69 (1999). The Michigan guidelines
became effective in 1983. See Sheila R. Deming, Michigan's Sentencing Guidelines, 79
MICH. B. J. 652 (2000). Oregon's sentencing guidelines became effective in 1989. See
OR. REv. STAT. § 138.33 (2005).
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The fate of federal courts in the 1970s and early 1980s paralleled that of
the states. In 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act, which
created the U.S. Sentencing Commission. 271 In 1987, the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines were born, and reigned supreme until Booker made them
advisory. Federal parole was abolished entirely in 1987.272
Likewise, the pre-sentence report (PSR) underwent a major
transformation.273 The primary role of the probation officer in preparing the
PSR became determining any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that
might apply to the crime-a switch from offender-based PSRs to offense-
based PSRs that are much less concerned with the offender's personal
background. 274 This switch reflects the larger shift in criminal sentencing
from rehabilitative goals to those of deterrence. 275
Unsurprisingly, America's prison, parole, and probation populations
have had an unprecedented expansion. 276 More than two million Americans
live behind bars, and many millions more are on parole or probation.277
Although state parole has been cut back as determinate sentencing has
become more popular, 278 many states still use early release to reward
prisoners for good behavior. Additionally, mandatory post-release
supervision, a required term of supervision imposed on offenders convicted
of committing violent felonies, has recently become popular.
As ancillary sentencing has developed over the past century, it has gone
in a variety of directions, often haphazardly, with differing degrees of
success in reforming, housing, and punishing convicted offenders. As Kevin
Reitz has argued, a "regrettable effect of the hands-off approach is that there
has been no meaningful constitutional brake on the nation's thirty-year
revolution in the use of prisons, jails, and community sanctions." 279 With its
271 Berman, supra note 10, at 7. For more on the history of the sentencing
guidelines, see Frase, supra note 270.
272 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 114, at 20 n.79.
273 Macallair, supra note 234.
274 Id.
275 Curtis Blakely & Vie Bumphus, American Criminal Justice Philosophy, 63 FED.
PROBATION 62, 64. But see Filler & Smith, supra note 255.
2 7 6 MICHAEL JACOBSON, DOwNSIZING PRISONS: How To REDUCE CRIME AND END
MASS INCARCERATION 8 (NYU Press 1995).
277 Id. at 8, 19.
278 See KEVIN REITZ, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING
REPORT TO THE COUNCIL 16 (2004), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencinglaw_
andpolicy/files/mpcreport to the council_2004_for blog.doc.
279 Reitz, supra note 216, at 1084.
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spotlight on all forms of punishment, however, Blakely has offered us a
chance to re-evaluate these procedures through the lens of the Sixth
Amendment historical jury right.
2. Front-End Sentencing: Blakely & Pre-Sentencing Procedures280
Although one or two of the proceedings discussed in this section are not
so much "front-end" (that is, before the sentencing hearing) than midway
(during the hearing itself), most take place before the official sentencing
hearing actually occurs. These proceedings include PSRs, persistent felony
offender statutes, prior convictions, and probation (or suspended sentences).
I examine each in turn. All of these procedures are arguably affected by
Blakely.
a. Pre-Sentence Reports
Although a common part of virtually every state sentencing scheme, the
pre-sentence report contains non-jury decision-making antithetical to
Blakely's requirements. It is instructive, then, to parse out what parts of the
PSR may not comport with Blakely's requirement that juries find all facts
that increase an offender's punishment.
A PSR is assembled by a bureaucratic agency, usually the probation
division or the state department of corrections, for the use of the trial court at
the sentencing hearing.281 The PSR normally contains facts about the offense
(both from the police report and those presented at trial), information on
recidivism, victim impact statements, the offender's prior family history,
employment, education, physical and mental health, financial condition,
future prospects, and a prognosis of rehabilitative promise. 282
280 In states with indeterminate sentencing systems-where sentences must range
between a minimum and a maximum sentence-Blakely may also come into play. For
more on indeterminate sentencing and Blakely, see John Wool & Don Stemen,
Aggravated Sentencing: Practical Implications for State Sentencing Systems, 17 FED.
SENT'G REP. 60, 61 (2004).
281 See Macallair, supra note 234.
282 See, e.g., N.Y. CRIM. PROC. § 390.30(1) (McKinney 2005):
The pre-sentence investigation consists of the gathering of information with respect
to the circumstances attending the commission of the offense, the defendant's
history of delinquency or criminality, and ... social history, employment history,
family situation, economic status, education, and personal habits. Such investigation
may also include any other matter which the agency conducting the investigation
2007]
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These facts and assertions, usually determined by the probation or
corrections officer, are utilized by the court to aggravate or mitigate the
punishment. 283 Additionally, the facts set down in the PSR often influence
the court's statements at the sentencing hearing, statements that affect the
determination of an offender's discretionary release date.
The original purpose of the PSR was to "provide information to the court
on the defendant's personal history and criminal conduct in order to promote
individualized sentencing." 284 In recent decades, however, the PSR has
become much more focused on offense characteristics over offender
characteristics, 285 with the exception of the oft-misused offender prognosis.
The probation department's creation of PSRs and the trial court's use of
them can have a large impact on the ultimate length and severity of a prison
term. These determinations of fact, which usually include an interview of the
defendant, a summary of his or future prospects and employability, and a
recommendation for leniency or harshness, are often hastily done with little
oversight from the defense bar or the courts. As has been observed about the
federal sentencing guidelines:
deems relevant to the question of sentence, and must include any matter the court
directs to be included.
Id.; MINN. STAT. § 609.115 (2003):
[T]he court shall, before sentence is imposed, cause a presentence investigation and
written report to be made to the court concerning the defendant's individual
characteristics, circumstances, needs, potentialities, criminal record and social
history, the circumstances of the offense and the harm caused by it to others and to
the community.
Id.; VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-237(A) (2003) (probation officer shall investigate all cases
referred to him by trial court and shall render reports of investigation); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9.95.200 (West 2000) (secretary of corrections or secretary's officers may
investigate and report to court circumstances surrounding the crime and concerning
defendant, defendant's prior record, and family surroundings and environment).
283 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203(b)(1) (West 2004). The statute provides:
[I]f a person is convicted of a felony and is eligible for probation, before judgment
is pronounced, the court shall immediately refer the matter to a probation officer to
investigate and report to the court, at a specified time, upon the circumstances
surrounding the crime and the prior history and record of the person, which may be
considered either in aggravation or mitigation of the punishment.
Id.




Without regard to the rules of evidence, without regard to the standard of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and without regard to other due process
limitations, the sentencing authority [can] consider any information that
might shed light on the crime the defendant had committed, other crimes he
had committed, or other aspects of his life choices and character.
2 86
Regrettably, this statement proves true for state PSRs as well.
Defendants have few rights when it comes to their PSR. Although most
states permit the defendant to review the report's content, there is little
recourse for any inaccuracies. The burden is on the defendant to prove any
error is harmful.2 87 Moreover, in Gregg v. United States,288 the Supreme
Court held that PSRs have "no formal limitations on their contents, and they
may rest on hearsay and contain information bearing no relation whatever to
the crime with which the defendant is charged.
2 89
PSRs can range in content from simply noting the fact of a prior
conviction (still constitutional under Almendarez-Torres) to complicated
documents going well beyond. California law, for example, has several
recidivist factors memorialized in the PSR that can increase sentences. A
California offender's PSR may include the offender's poor performance on a
previous term of parole, something itself determined by a parole officer, a
purely bureaucratic functionary.2 90
Likewise, in cases eligible for probation, a California offender has her
fitness evaluated by a probation officer, who investigates "the circumstances
surrounding the crime and the prior history and record of the person, which
may be considered either in aggravation or mitigation of the punishment."
29 1
The probation officer must make a written report of his findings to the court,
"including his or her recommendations as to the granting or denying of
probation and the conditions of probation, if granted. ' 292 These negative
recommendations and non-jury determinations are particularly damaging
because courts tend to rely heavily on the recommendations of the PSR,
rarely challenging the findings within. This practice leaves some very
286 STrrH & CABRANES, supra note 114, at 28.
287 Macallair, supra note 234.
288 394 U.S. 489 (1969).
289 Gregg, 394 U.S. at 492.
290 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203(b)(2)(A) (West 2004).
291 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203(b)(1) (West 2004).
292 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203(b)(2)(A) (West 2004). The probation officer must also
include recommendations on the restitution amount. § 1203(b)(2)(D)(i).
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influential fact determinations to an unelected functionary of a -bureaucratic
institution.293
Jones itself illustrated how recommendations in PSRs can ultimately end
up violating an offender's right to have a jury determination of all key facts.
In Jones, the PSR recommended that the defendant be sentenced to twenty-
five years for the carjacking because one of the victims had suffered serious
bodily injury; the recommended punishment was duly imposed.294 Jones,
however, overturned the underlying conviction because the crime of
inflicting serious bodily injury should have rightfully been classified as an
offense element, to be determined by the jury, not a sentencing enhancement
to be determined by the court.295 In other words, Jones teaches that a factor
in a PSR becomes an element of a crime when it "not only provide[s] for
steeply higher penalties, but condition[s] them on further facts (injury,
death) that seem quite as important as the elements" either in the original
indictment or statute. 296
Similarly, many facts in the PSR are left to the probation officer's
investigation and determination. Just as Jones found that a sentencing
enhancement should not be mentioned in the PSR and left to the court,
applying Blakely's mandate makes suspect many of the other facts in a PSR.
The principles underlying Jones and Blakely strongly suggest that certain
aspects of the PSR may no longer pass constitutional muster.
Few state courts have addressed whether PSRs come within Blakely's
reach, and those that have are in disagreement over whether Blakely applies.
In Dickenson v. State,297 an Indiana appellate court held that Blakely did not
apply to the state's system of compiling PSRs, because the trial court gave
the defendant the opportunity to review and object to the contents of the
report. 298 In People v. Isaacks,299 however, the Supreme Court of Colorado
293 In Illinois, however, the probation services department is quasi-judicial: the chief
judge of each circuit must provide full-time probation services for all counties within the
circuit, and appoints the chief probation officer and all other probation officers from lists
of qualified applicants supplied by the Supreme Court. See 730 ILL. COMP. STAT.
110/15(2)(a)-(b) (2006).
294 Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 231 (1999).
29 51 d. at 235.
296 Id. at 233. A sentencing factor in a PSR also becomes an offense element where
it has elsewhere been treated as defining an offense element. Id. at 235.
297 835 N.E.2d 542 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
298 Id. at 554-55. In Indiana, failure to object to the contents of the PSR waives any
issue with its use in enhancing a sentence. See id.
299 133 P.3d 1190 (Colo. 2006).
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held that after Blakely, the trial court could not enhance an offender's
sentence based on contested assertions in the PSR.300 The Isaacks court,
concerned with the defendant's Sixth Amendment jury right, found that
Blakely did not permit sentencing courts to use facts admitted by the
defendant unless there was a knowing and voluntary waiver of these
rights301 regardless of whether the admissions were in a police report or, as
here, in the PSR. Critically, the Colorado Supreme Court interpreted Blakely
as "extend[ing] to all facts that are not reflected in a jury verdict or, in the
case of a plea bargain, to all facts beyond those that establish the elements of
the charged offense." 30 2
Likewise, in a 2005 unpublished opinion, the Tennessee Court of
Criminal Appeals found that "the portion of the presentence report relating
to the defendant's admission of prior drug use [did] not contain sufficient
guarantees of trustworthiness to justify application of [sentence
enhancement guidelines] for prior criminal history without offending
Blakely.'' 303 Such concern about the defendant's full right to a jury trial
should serve as exemplar for future state court decisions.
It can be argued that a narrower understanding of Blakely does not
require juries to find every fact that may increase an offender's sentence,
particularly when such facts do not comprise any part of the offense element,
such as in the PSR. This argument works on two levels. First, on a basic
historical level, American courts in the constitutional era dealt with few
felonies, let alone the wide array of pre- and post-sentencing procedures that
we have today. As this argument goes, the Founders never dreamed of
applying the Sixth Amendment right to facts not constituting part of the
offense elements. Therefore, since Blakely depends on a doctrinal/historical
view of the Sixth Amendment, any sentencing proceeding that did not exist
during the constitutional period need not meet Blakely's strictures.
This type of historical argument, however, can be defeated by reviewing
the constitutional requirements in other criminal law contexts, many of
which also did not exist during the Founders' era. We apply constitutional
protections to a variety of procedures unheard of in the late-eighteenth
century, including police infrared searches, car stops, and Miranda rights, to
300 See id. at 1192. Specifically, defendant contested the PSR assertions that he had
admitted his removal from a treatment program due to violence, and that he was resistant
to treatment. Id. at 1191.
301 See id. at 1192.
302 Id. at 1193.
303 State v. Torres, No. M2004-00559-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 292431, at *8 (Tenn.
Crim. App. Feb. 4, 2005).
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name a few. So, the fact that the PSR is a twentieth-century sentencing tool
cannot help in avoiding application of Blakely principles.
A second, more practical argument contends that the facts set out in
PSRs could be seen as minor facts, ones that do not truly require
determination by the jury. This understanding of Blakely argues that the
offender's personal and correctional history (including unproven charges),
the description of the crime (using facts from both the police report and the
trial), and prognosis of rehabilitative promise are insufficiently important to
truly merit the full panoply of Sixth Amendment jury rights.
What this sort of argument fails to consider, however, is the critical
importance of these offender-based characteristics and offense-based facts in
potentially increasing an offender's punishment. For example, PSRs
commonly include statements about the crime from the police report, some
of which have never been admitted into evidence, some of which are pure
hearsay, and none of which have been presented to the jury. Allowing the
court to determine the reliability and impact of these facts on an offender's
punishment seems a simple end-run around the Sixth Amendment jury right.
Similarly, the descriptions of the offender's personal and correctional
history can be equally unreliable. Although prior convictions are still
acceptable terms upon which to increase a sentence, often the PSR contains
information about prior arrests and even indictments that were dismissed,
information that can negatively influence the court's determination of
punishment. Additionally, in cases where the jury finds that certain offenses
were not proven, the court may still take the facts of those offenses--often
listed in the PSR-into account. In other words, an offender can be punished
for crimes that were never proven beyond a reasonable doubt, surely a
violation of constitutional proportions.
Moreover, the statements made about an offender's correctional history
and rehabilitative promise--determined by probation officers, prison
officials, and other unelected, unrepresentative bureaucrats-can be
extremely arbitrary, especially since these determinations are often collected
from functionaries with only minor interactions with the offender. Thus the
PSR can contain a variety of unsubstantiated or biased determinations
treated as "fact" by the court, far from the eye of the jury.
Stated differently, the PSR is a "classic example of something depending
on findings of historical fact, which have never been adjudicated at all, much
less adjudicated in a prior proceeding in which the defendant had a right to a
jury and truth beyond a reasonable doubt. ' 304 Accordingly, one solution
would be to allow the jury, in a bifurcated sentencing procedure, to
304 Weisberg, supra note 22, at 648 (citing J. Bradley O'Connell).
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determine which facts in the PSR would be eligible to increase or decrease
the offender's punishment. 305 Therefore, if information on recidivism, victim
impact statements, the offender's prior family history, employment,
education, physical and mental health, financial condition, future prospects,
and prognosis of rehabilitative promise are seen, as they must, as important
factual findings made by bureaucratic functionaries that can increase the
defendant's punishment, then at least part of the PSR comes under Blakely's
mandate.
b. Persistent Felony Offender Schemes
A number of states permit sentence enhancement based on statutes
which mix recidivism, past violence, and statements on PSRs. These
schemes, sometimes dubbed "three strikes" laws, may also come under
Blakely's purview.
Although California can lay claim to the most infamous three-strike law,
New York has a persistent felony offender statute that runs counter to
Blakely's animating principle. A New York trial court is authorized-but not
required-to sentence an offender with two prior felony convictions to a
much longer incarceration period than would normally be permitted. The
determination of whether the offender is eligible for the "persistent felony
offender" status, however, is left to the judge alone, which seems to violate
Blakely on its face.
Under New York law, when the prosecutor requests persistent felony
offender status for a defendant, the trial court holds a hearing to determine
whether the severity and number of the offender's past crimes requires
adjudication. 30 6 An enhanced punishment must be based on judicial
weighing of the "history and character of the defendant and the nature and
circumstances of his criminal conduct. '30 7 Although some procedural due
process is used during the hearing, none of the facts which lead to the
imposition of persistent felony offender status is determined by a jury.308
Instead, the relevant facts are provided by the prosecutor and defense
counsel. The court, in a special sentencing hearing, determines whether the
convicted offender is classified as a persistent felony offender by evaluating
305 See, e.g., Prescott & Starr, supra note 216, at 320 ("For instance, if Blakely is
extended to include the defendant's criminal history, jury review of presentence reports
could be far less costly than live testimony on past crimes.").
306 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.10 (McKinney 2005).
307 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.10(2) (McKinney 2005).
308 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.10 (McKinney 2005).
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her past criminal history.309 The offender's criminal history can include past
behavior on parole, prior convictions, statements from probation and parole
officers, and acquitted conduct. Because persistent felony offender
classification results in a lengthened sentence for the offender-substantially
greater than any maximum sentence allowed-based on facts found by non-
jury members, the persistent felony offender statute runs against Blakely's
mandate.
After Blakely and Booker were decided, New York's persistent felony
offender statute was challenged as unconstitutional. In People v. Rivera,310 a
criminal defendant was convicted of "unauthorized use of a vehicle in the
second degree," a class E felony carrying a maximum sentence of four years
imprisonment, and the People moved for persistent felony offender status (in
order to treat the conviction as a class A-i felony).311 The trial court held a
special sentencing hearing, first determining that the defendant qualified as a
discretionary persistent felony offender, and then heard arguments from both
sides concerning defendant's history and character.312 Some of the
prosecutor's evidence consisted of facts never found by a jury, including the
defendant's use of multiple aliases, his failure to comply with probation and
parole, his ongoing drug addiction, and his low probability of
"ever... giv[ing] up the lifestyle he supported by crime." 313
In determining whether it wished to sentence defendant as a persistent
felony offender, the trial court stated to the defendant that "the issue that we
are addressing in that respect is whether or not your history, character, the
nature and circumstances of your criminal conduct are such that extended
incarceration and lifetime supervision of you is warranted to best serve the
public's interest. ''314 To do so, the court determined, in its own discretion,
the stability of defendant's employment history, the theft's effect on the
victim, and defendant's alleged attempt to distract the police from the escape
of the other car occupants. 315 After finding these facts, the trial court
imposed a fifteen years-to-life sentence. 316
309 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.10 (McKinney 2005).
310 5 N.Y.3d 61 (2005).
311 Id. at 63.
312 ld. at 63-64.
313 Id. at 64.
314Id.
315 Id.
316 Rivera, 5 N.Y.3d at 65.
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On appeal, defendant argued that New York's persistent offender statute
violated the Sixth Amendment after Blakely because it requires a judge,
rather than a jury, to determine whether an offender is eligible for
discretionary persistent offender status.317 The New York Court of Appeals
ultimately upheld the persistent felony offender statute, finding that New
York's scheme only required proof of two prior felony convictions to qualify
a defendant as a persistent felony offender and a life sentence. 318 However,
the stark difference between the statutory interpretation of the majority and
that of the dissent neatly frames the question of whether Blakely should be
expanded to ancillary sentencing proceedings.
Both the majority and the dissent agreed on the basic premise that the
Sixth Amendment requires that any fact (other than a prior conviction) used
to increase a sentence beyond the maximum must be found by a jury beyond
a reasonable doubt.319 It was in their interpretations of the persistent felony
offender statute that the two dramatically parted ways.
Under the majority's view, the statute only required two prior
convictions to qualify a defendant as a persistent felony offender, and
nothing more-no other fact-finding was needed. Accordingly, the Rivera
court held that the statute's extra procedural language, requiring the trial
court to weigh the character of the defendant and "the nature and
circumstances of his criminal conduct," served only as extra instructions for
the trial court, and was part of its "traditional discretionary sentencing
role." 3 2
0
In contrast, the Rivera dissents took strong issue with this understanding
of the trial court's role determining persistent felony offender status. Chief
Judge Kaye's dissent argued that merely qualifying as a discretionary
persistent felony offender by dint of having two prior felony convictions was
"necessary but not sufficient" to render an offender eligible for enhanced
sentencing.321 Instead, an enhanced sentence was only imposed on those
defendants whose "extended incarceration and lifetime supervision will best
serve the public interest. '322 In Kaye's view, a convicted offender with two
317 Id.
318 Id
319 Id. at 65-66.
320 Id. at 66, 69. In other words, for the majority, the existence of the offender's two
prior convictions was the "fact" increasing the sentence, and the determinations regarding
the offender's character and nature were just a way to "grant[] defendants a right to an
airing and an explanation." Id. at 68.
321 Id. at 73 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting).
322 Rivera, 5 N.Y.3d at 73 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting).
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prior felony convictions is transformed into a discretionary persistent felony
offender only after the court makes a determination about his history,
character, and past criminal conduct-a process, in other words, on a
collision course with Blakely.323
Since the statute specifically requires the trial court, as part of this
second step, to "make such findings of fact as it deems relevant to the
question of whether a persistent felony offender sentence is warranted," 324 it
seems impossible for the Rivera court to have construed the discretionary
persistent felony offender statute as constitutional following Blakely without
essentially rewriting the statute-a job for the legislature, not the court. The
Rivera majority basically stripped the "discretionary" aspect of the statute
away without removing the power of the trial court.
The Rivera court's decision to lean away from a democratic, community-
based consensus on punishment and towards a more judicial role in ancillary
sentencing resulted in a movement away from Blakely's mandate. As Judge
Ciparick argued in her dissent, "[t]he majority fail[ed] to recognize that the
Supreme Court holdings in Ring, Blakely, and Booker represent a significant
shift in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. '325 When analyzed closely, Rivera
did not honor the Sixth Amendment's reservation of jury power, and
permitted an unconstitutional statute to stand.326
Most recently, however, two New York federal judges have found New
York's persistent felony offender statute unconstitutional. Both the Southern
District and the Eastern District of New York have now held that N.Y. Penal
Law Section 70.10 violates the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial
because, under the rapidly evolving case law of the U.S. Supreme Court, a
jury has to find the facts that the state law leaves to the judge. 327 These
decisions directly conflict with another Southern District decision holding
323 Id. at 74 (Kaye, C.J., dissenting). Kaye's dissent argued precisely thus: "Blakely
makes clear that anyfacfinding essential to sentence enhancement must be decided by a
jury, even if it is general and unspecified in nature, and even if the ultimate sentencing
determination is discretionary." Id. at 73.
324 N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW. § 400.20(9) (McKinney 2005).
325 Rivera, 5 N.Y.3d at 83 (Ciparick, J. dissenting).
326 Rivera is currently good law in New York, despite the Second Circuit's
description of the statute's second phase as "a vague, amorphous assessment" of whether
the public interest would be served through imposition of a recidivist sentence. Brown v.
Grenier, 409 F.3d 523, 534 (2d Cir. 2005). However, Brown, which upheld the statute,
was based on an Apprendi challenge to the statute, not Blakely. Accordingly, Rivera
could potentially be overturned on Blakely grounds.
327 See Washington v. Poole, No. 06 Civ. 2415 (JGW), 2007 WL 24335166
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2007); Portalatin v. Graham, 478 F. Supp.2d 385 (E.D.N.Y. 2007).
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that New York's persistent felony offender statute is constitutional after
Blakely.328 All of these decisions will join a fourth that is currently pending
in the Second Circuit. 329 Thus the constitutionality of New York Penal Law
Section 70 after Blakely is still very much in dispute.
c. Prior Convictions
One area of ancillary sentencing that has resisted the incursion of
Blakely is in the use of prior convictions. This is an area ripe for change,
however. As I briefly discussed above, one result of Almendarez-Torres was
the preservation of the "prior conviction" exception for sentencing
procedures. 330
Specifically, both Apprendi and Blakely state that their rule requiring
certain facts to be either proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt or
admitted by the defendant only applies to facts "other than the fact of a prior
conviction." This exception conflicts with Blakely's animating principles,
since prior convictions can often be both inaccurate and confusing. 331
Moreover, when the specific facts of the prior conviction are in dispute, it is
currently the trial court that resolves any question of fact regarding a prior
conviction.
The theoretical basis of Almendarez-Torres' "prior conviction"
exception has been repeatedly questioned, most recently by Justice Clarence
Thomas. In the dissent from the denial of certiorari in Rangel-Reyes v.
United States, Thomas got straight to the heart of the matter. Citing
Apprendi numerous times, Thomas argued that if a crime includes all facts
used as a basis for imposing or increasing punishment,332 then the prior
conviction exception is grounded not in the Constitution, but only in
Supreme Court precedent: "[T]he exception to trial by jury for establishing
'the fact of a prior conviction' finds its basis not in the Constitution, but in a
precedent of this Court."333
328 See Morris v. Artus, No. 06 Civ. 4095 (RWS), 2007 WL 2200699 (S.D.N.Y.
July 30, 2007).
329 See Phillips v. Artus, No. 05 Civ. 7974 (PAC), 2006 WL 1867386 (S.D.N.Y.
June 30, 2006).
330 Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 230 (1998).
331 Such as out-of-state or foreign convictions; sometimes an offense can be a
felony in one state and a misdemeanor in another, or differ in levels of degree.
332 In other words, what I have been calling the animating principle of Blakely.
333 Rangel-Reyes v. United States, 126 S. Ct.. 2873, 2874 (2006) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (citations omitted).
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By demoting the prior conviction exception from constitutional rule to
mere precedent, Thomas set the stage for possibly overruling the exception.
And in repeatedly referring to Apprendi, Thomas returned to the heart of the
Sixth Amendment jury trial guarantee, that only a jury may find facts that
increase an offender's punishment. The implication is that the Almendarez-
Torres exception could be overruled as a court-made rule.
On a more practical note, Thomas also noted that a majority of the
current Court rejected the exception,334 and it was its positive duty to
"address the ongoing validity"335 of the exception-not only because it was
the Court's sole prerogative,336 but also because until the exception's
reversal, "countless criminal defendants will be denied the full protection
afforded by the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, notwithstanding the agreement
of a majority of the Court that this result is unconstitutional. '337 Thomas's
return to the bedrock guarantees of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, and his
concern over the shortchanged rights of criminal offenders, helps illustrate
the continuing importance of the Court's "rediscovered" right to a jury trial
for all facts enhancing punishment, precedent and stare decisis
notwithstanding. For Thomas, and for a growing number on the Court, the
animating principles of Blakely must trump any judge-made rules.
Thomas's statements, in both Shepard and Rangel-Reyes, strongly
suggest that there are no longer five Justices who support the Almendarez-
Torres exception. 338 Nevertheless, the "prior conviction" exception currently
remains good law.
A few courts had begun to question the prior conviction exception even
prior to Shepard's signal that it might be endangered. For example, one
district court has suggested that Blakely may necessitate the use of
indictments to allege prior convictions that will be used to enhance the
defendant's sentence. In Wilson v. McGinnis,339 the Southern District of
New York noted that: "Due process requires notice of sentence
enhancements based on recidivism .... Indeed, notice of the enhancement
probably has to be alleged in the indictment. '340 In other words, the
334 See id.
335 Id. at 2875.
336 Id.
337 Id.
338 Particularly with the 6-3 split in Cunningham. Any attempt to "read the tea-
leaves," though, is purely speculative on my part.
339 No. 03 Civ. 4625(AKH), 2004 WL 1534160 (S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2004).
340 Wilson, 2004 WL 1534160 at *6 n.5.
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Southern District of New York argued that fully complying with Blakely's
Fifth and Sixth Amendment guarantees requires actual allegations of the
prior crimes in the indictment-i.e., well before the trial, let alone
sentencing-instead of in the PSR.
Such reasoning, combined with Thomas's strong hints dropped in
Shepard and his dissent from Rangel-Reyes's certiorari denial, may
ultimately lead to a revision of the prior conviction exception, if not to its
outright reversal. 34 1 Accordingly, it is an ancillary sentencing procedure
upon which to focus in the coming terms.
d. Probation
In contrast to prior convictions, probation has been given little scrutiny
so far. Probation is most often imposed on convicted defendants in lieu of a
sentence, or as part of a suspended sentence. 342 In many states, a term of
probation means a suspension of the execution of a sentence and an order of
conditional and revocable release under the supervision of a probation
officer.343 One hallmark of this kind of dispositional departure is the trial
court's flexibility in shifting from a presumptive non-incarcerative sentence,
such as an out-of-prison probationary length of time, to a term of
341 1 only briefly touch on the prior conviction exception here, as its full
ramifications go well beyond the scope of this piece.
342 See generally Scott H. Ikeda, Probation Revocations as Delayed Dispositional
Departures: Why Blakely v. Washington Requires Jury Trials at Probation Violation
Hearings, 24 LAW & INEQ. 157 (2006).
343 See TEx. CONST. art. IV § 1 IA (Texas state courts have power to impose
probation as part of suspended sentence); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203(a) (West 2004 &
Supp. 2007). See also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-29(a) (West 2001 & Supp. 2007)
(period of probation in lieu of incarceration and includes probation supervision); FLA.
STAT. ANN. §§ 948.001(1), (2) (West 2001 & Supp. 2007) (probation instead of prison
term or as part of a suspended sentence that includes supervision); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. 5/5-6-1 (West 1993 & Supp. 2007) (court may impose probation instead of
imprisonment, probation agency must supervise); MASS. ANN. LAW. ch. 279, § IA
(LexisNexis 2002) (probation a condition of suspended sentence); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 65.10(3)(a) (McKinney 2004 & Supp. 2007) (probation imposed with supervision by
officer when confinement found unnecessary); OR. REv. STAT. § 137.533 (2005) (court
can sentence prisoner to probation in lieu of sentence or as part of suspended sentence,
supervised by probation officer); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-303.2 (2004) and § 53.1-145
(2005 & Supp. 2007) (court may sentence first-time offender to probation, supervised by
probation officer); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.92.060 (West 2003 & Supp. 2007) (court
may summarily grant probation and order supervision of offender).
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incarceration. These decisions to impose these dispositions are often based
entirely on a judicial factual determination. 344
Most supervised probation follows similar patterns. These include a
requirement to meet regularly with a counselor or probation officer (often,
but not always, from the department of corrections), a long list of forbidden
activities and associations,345 and some sort of procedure in which the facts
of an alleged violation can be determined and adjudicated, most often under
a preponderance of the evidence standard. Although the prosecutor has the
burden of persuasion at these revocation hearings, she is not required to
prove the violation beyond a reasonable doubt, as she would at trial. 346 An
offender's violation of probation terms usually results in incarceration, either
for the first time (as in a stayed sentence) or as a return to prison. 347
The Supreme Court has held that the determination of a violation of
probation is entitled to the minimum requirements of due process, including
written notice of the claimed violations.348 Likewise, most states require
some sort of due process hearing in front of a court before probation is
revoked and a person is returned to prison. For example, in Massachusetts, a
violation of a condition of probation must be found "at least to a reasonable
344 If, however; the terms of probation were authorized by a legislature via statute,
the Blakely problem would be significantly diminished. Because the imposition of such
non-incarcerative sentence would be determined by duly elected representatives of the
community, whatever Sixth Amendment rights necessary to impose such a disposition
would be met.
345 For example, in Florida, an offender's term of probation could include
community-based sanctions such as rehabilitative restitution, curfew, revocation or
suspension of a driver's license, community service, deprivation of non-essential
activities or privileges; random substance abuse testing; home visits by probation
supervisors; steady employment; restriction of movement; support of legal dependants;
no interaction with criminals; prohibition on possessing firearms; prohibition on alcohol
consumption and on visiting places where such intoxicants are sold; drawing of blood;
and other unspecified terms. See FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 948.01(3)(a), 948.03(a)-(n) (West
2001 & Supp. 2007).
346 See Brian G. Bieluch, Thirty-First Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: IV
Sentencing: Probation, 90 GEO. L.J. 1813, 1826 (2002).
347 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3716(b) (1995 & Supp. 2006) (statute regarding
stayed sentence and probation revocation).
348 See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973) (holding that a probationer
under a suspended sentence entitled to minimum requirements of due process before
probation could be revoked); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 486-87 (1972)




degree of certainty. '349 In Florida, a probationer must receive proper notice
of the claimed violation, as well as some minimum due process, before
probation can be revoked.350 In Connecticut, a revocation of probation
hearing has been determined to be less formal than a criminal trial, and
requires only that the state prove its case by a preponderance of the
evidence. 351 In Tennessee, after a violation of probation is alleged, a hearing
is held in front of a trial court, and the defendant is allowed to testify;352
guilt must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 353
Often state court judges have the ability to lengthen the sentence at a
probation violation proceeding, something Blakely may now require to be
left in the hands of the jury, or at least some representative of the
community. For example, in North Dakota, a court may re-sentence a
defendant to a harsher sentence than his original sentence imposed,354 under
the reasoning that this "does not subject him to multiple punishments for the
same offense." 355 "Such a practice, rather, 'reflects the need to alter the
defendant's sentence in light of the fact that the court's initial sentence of
probation was not effective and must be altered. ", 356
To best see the great discretion given to courts and state corrections
boards in the area of probation, it is helpful to study a state's statutes in
depth. One excellent example is California, which processes a large number
of offenders through its prisons on a yearly basis. California governs its
ancillary sentencing procedures through either judicial or bureaucratic
actors, with very little jury (or democratic) participation. In that sense, it is
about as far from Blakely's animating principles as a state can get.
349 Commonwealth v. Maggio, 605 N.E.2d 1247, 1250 (Mass. 1993). See also
Commonwealth v. Durling, 551 N.E.2d 1193, 1195 (Mass. 1990) (defendant at probation
revocation proceedings entitled to certain due process protections).
350 See State v. Spratling, 336 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1976) (where probationer failed to
receive proper notice of claimed violation serving basis of probation revocation, not
afforded due process).
351 See State v. McDowell, 699 A.2d 987, 989 (Conn. 1997); State v. Davis, 641
A.2d 370, 378 (Conn. 1994).
352 State v. Wade, 863 S.W.2d 406, 408 (Tenn. 1993).
353 See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-311 (e) (2006).
354 Davis v. State, 625 N.W.2d 855, 858 (N.D. 2001).
355 Id. at 859 (quoting State v. Jones, 418 N.W.2d 782, 784 (N.D. 1988)).
356 State v. Jones, 418 N.W.2d 782, 784 (N.D. 1988); see also State v. Miller, 418
N.W.2d 614, 616 (N.D. 1988). When a defendant's probation is revoked, Section 12.1-
32-07(4) of the North Dakota code provides a trial court with the authority to re-sentence
him to any sentence originally available.
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With probation, California's trial courts determine whether a convicted
offender may receive a sentence of probation, or "the suspension of the
imposition or execution of a sentence and the order of conditional and
revocable release in the community. ' 357 Additionally, in cases involving hate
crimes, the trial court has the authority to require the convicted offender's
participation in a variety of alternative sanctions in addition to the sentence
of probation, including the completion of a class or program on racial/ethnic
sensitivity or civil rights, additional restitution to programs or agencies that
provide service, and reimbursing the victim for reasonable costs of
counseling. 358 Since the imposition of these punishments is fully
discretionary on the part of the court, and increases the offender's
punishment, this qualifies as a form of fact-finding by the judge forbidden by
Blakely.
. Once removed from the California courtroom, the fact-finding for
probation shifts from judicial to wholly bureaucratic-moving further and
further away from Blakely legitimacy. Supervision of the probationer falls to
the county probation officer "who... determine[s], both the level and type of
supervision consistent with the court-ordered conditions of probation. 359
The probation officer is the sole determinant of whether the probationer has
violated any of the terms of probation.360 Violation of probation terms
usually results in revocation of the conditional release. 361
Likewise, California's Proposition 36 contains a variety of fact-finding
procedures by non-jury actors that often increase a convicted offender's
punishment. Proposition 36 requires a sentence of probation and drug
treatment instead of prison for those non-violent drug offenders arrested for
personal use crimes, with exceptions for offenders who "refuse" or are
"unamenable" to treatment. 362 Decisions about personal drug use, refusal of
drug treatment, and general amenability to rehabilitation are made solely by
the trial court. 363 It seems, then, that California's ancillary sentencing
proceedings lean heavily towards the bureaucratic and judicial, as opposed
to the democratic-a state of affairs clearly in opposition to the animating
principle of the Apprendi-Blakely line of cases.
357 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
358 CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 422.85(a)(1)-(3) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
359 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1202.8(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
360 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.2(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).
361 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.2(a) (West 2004 & Supp. 2007).




Within the ten states I studied, probation was primarily used as a court-
ordered measure in lieu of a sentence, or as part of a suspended sentence. 364
Only one state, Florida, used probation as both a conditional release system
and as a form of a suspended sentence. 365 In each of the states I surveyed,
the trial court determined whether the defendant was eligible for probation,
and in many states, also set the long list of conditions that the probationer
had to follow.366 As I briefly discussed above, the list of conditions imposed
by the court can be lengthy and onerous (such as in Florida). Although these
conditions may not technically increase the length of an offender's sentence,
their imposition definitely enhances the offender's punishment. Although the
legislature sets the terms of the conditions, the decision whether to
implement them is left to the court, not the jury. 367
Once the term of probation has been set, a combination of judicial and
bureaucratic decision-makers decide the facts that determined whether
probation has been properly followed. Usually, the evidence of a possible
probation violation is collected by the probation officer or commission, and
any decision to revoke the period of probation is made by the court. 368 The
jury, however, has no hand in any aspect of probation, from imposition to
364 See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. IV § 1 A; CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203(a) (West 2004 &
Supp. 2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-29(c) (2001 & Supp. 2007); 730 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 5/5-6-3 (West 1993 & Supp. 2007); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 276, § 87
(LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2007); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10 (McKinney 2004 & Supp.
2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 137.533 (2005); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-303.2 (2004); WASH
REV. CODE ANN. § 9.95.204 (West 2003 & Supp. 2007).
365 See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.01(2) (West 2001 & Supp. 2007) (court releases
offender on probation if determined that "ends of justice and the welfare of society do
not require" incarceration); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 947.1405(3) (West 2001 & Supp. 2007)
(probation used as part of conditional release process from prison).
366 See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. IV § lIA (conditions set by statute); CONN. GEN.
STAT. ANN. § 53a-29(a) (West 2001 & Supp. 2007); FLA. STAT. § 948.01 (2005); 730
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/5-6-2 (West 2001 & Supp. 2007) (conditions of probation set
by statute); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 276, § 87A (LexisNexis 2002); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 65.10 (McKinney 2004 & Supp 2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 137.540 (2005) (conditions of
probation set by statute); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-303.2 (2004) (probation for
misdemeanor offenses); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.95.200 (West 2003 & Supp. 2007).
367 For another discussion of conditions added to probation, see Wool, supra note
205, at 7 (discussing whether a sentence includes "dispositional sentencing
determinations," which "alters the manner of service rather than the duration of the
sentence" for Blakely purposes). See also Ikeda, supra note 342, at 158.
368 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203.2 (West 2004 & Supp. 2007); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 53a-32(a) (West 2001 & Supp. 2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.06(2)(a) (West
2001 & Supp. 2007).
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revocation, despite its potential to increase the kind and length of prison
sentence for the probationer.
In sum, a change in sentence from a non-incarcerative probation period
to a term of imprisonment, based on factual determinations made by non-
jury actors, might be seen as an increase in the maximum sentence.369 As
probation is currently constituted in many states, it does not seem to follow
the requirements of Blakely.370 If length of punishment is measured by
length of time in prison-as our system, and even the most minimalist
interpretation of Blakely, currently does measure it-then changes in
dispositional departures come into Blakely's gambit. 371 As such, many states
may want to rethink the vast discretion given to courts and state agencies
during and after the sentencing hearing.
3. Back-End Sentencing: Blakely and Post-Sentencing Procedures
A sentence does not end upon the completion of the offender's term of
imprisonment, of course. As a matter of definition, a modem sentence
includes all aspects of supervision to which the offender is subject, including
parole, post-release supervision, and restitution. Once a prisoner is released,
the terms of her probation and supervised release, initially determined by the
state legislature and court imposed, are enforced and regulated by parole
officers. The amount of restitution, although imposed during the sentencing
proceeding, is collected after the sentencing hearing by either the trial court
or the parole officer. These back-end sentencing proceedings, which can
increase the length and the burden of an offender's sentence, must also be
369 Whether this kind of sentence change from probation to incarceration would also
be seen as punishment is a more complicated matter. On the one hand, the Supreme
Court has made clear that not every imposition on offenders and/or prisoners constitutes
impermissible punishment. See, e.g., Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484-85 (1995)
(rejecting due process challenge to in-prison discipline). On the other, the decision to
revoke a sentence of probation, thereby denying the offender her liberty, certainly has a
punishing effect. Because I lean towards a broader conception of punishment, I would
tend to include the revocation of probation as a punishment under Blakely terms, but
recognize the arguments against it.
370 See, e.g., Ikeda, supra note 342, at 175 ("[U]pward dispositional departures
enhance the severity of a defendant's sentence, again implicating Blakely .... It is
undeniable that sentences of commitment to state prison are more serious than stayed
sentences of probation.").
371 Prior to Blakely, both Kansas and California state courts held that Apprendi did
not apply when a sentence of probation was increased to incarceration. See State v. Car,
53 P.3d 843, 850 (Kan. 2001); People v. Saenz, No. D039214, 2003 WL 133020, at *3-4
(Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2003) (unpublished).
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considered in Blakely's wake. For too long, the system of back-end
sentencing has been hidden from public view. 372
Most criminal sentences involve a period of supervised release following
the completion of the imposed sentence. 373 A violation usually leads to the
revocation of the conditional release, and sometimes even lengthens the
duration of the original prison term.374 The question of whether supervised
release has been violated is determined by the trial court, using some
minimum level of procedural due process, with facts provided by a probation
officer or the department of corrections. 375
When prisoners are released before serving their full sentences, they are
invariably placed on supervised release. For example, when federal
offenders are released from prison, they are supervised for a period imposed
by the judge as part of the sentence. 376 The Guidelines require that nearly all
felony offenders be sentenced to at least two years of supervised release
following incarceration, 377 and as most federal courts still follow the
Guidelines to some extent, this kind of supervised release is still in practice.
Additionally, parole boards still exist in the majority of states, in the federal
system for those prisoners who committed their crimes before 1987, and in
the military--although they possess varying levels of discretion. 378
As a beginning matter, having courts or administrative officials
determining facts regarding parole or post-release supervision violation-
facts that can have a very real effect on the length of convicted defendants'
sentences-seems to conflict with Blakely. If, A la Blakely, a jury must
decide all facts that could increase a defendant's maximum sentence, then a
variety of parole and post-release proceedings would be subject to the
rediscovered Sixth Amendment right discussed above. Furthermore, if
372 Travis, supra note 7, at 6.
373 For example, in New York, all felonies come with a period of post-release
supervision between one and five years, depending on the severity of the offense. See
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.45 (McKinney 2004 & Supp. 2007).
374 See Bamonte, supra note 239, at 123.
375 In addition, in probation revocations, courts have unilateral discretion to execute
the sentence and send the defendant to prison. See, e.g., Ikeda, supra note 342, at 157.
376 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 114, at 5 n.9. As noted above, parole has been
eradicated in the federal system.
377 STITH & CABRANES, supra note 114, at 5 n.9.
378 See THE ASSOCIATION OF PAROLING AUTHORITIES INTERNATIONAL & THE
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF CORRECTIONS, HANDBOOK FOR NEW PAROLE BOARD MEMBERS 1




Blakely's animating principles are followed, virtually all proceedings
determining parole and post-release supervision would fall into its gambit.
There are few procedures and safeguards in most parole and post-release
supervision proceedings, and the decisions are most often made by a member
of the corrections bureaucracy. Because no one in such systems is
responsible for creating sentencing policy on a systemwide level, the case-
by-case decisions of parole boards and probation officers can be
"astonishingly haphazard. ' 379 These federal and state standards are far from
the requirements that are inherent in the Sixth Amendment jury right.380
Blakely suggests that it is time to reevaluate the decision-makers who
determine the outcomes of post-prison release proceedings.
These assertions are best supported by surveying the actual statutes
regulating parole and post-release supervision from certain representative
states. For greater clarity, I have divided my analysis of the collected data
into three categories, parole, post-release supervision, and restitution.
a. Parole
Parole is the ancillary sentencing procedure that comes most readily to
mind in the popular imagination. A prisoner's parole date can play a large
role in increasing or decreasing the actual length of his imprisonment. 381
This decision is made not by judge, jury, or legislature, but by a disparate
assortment of prison officials and department of corrections personnel. It is
the parole board, "acting as a back-end [sentencing authority], which
determines the actual incarceration length by deciding if or when to grant the
inmate discretionary parole release. '382 A prisoner's parole release date
relies primarily on two things: his or her behavior in prison (often
379 Kevin Reitz, Modeling Discretion in American Sentencing Systems, 20 LAw &
POL'Y 389, 390 (1998).
380 There has been some commentary, by federal public defenders and others, that
Booker also leaves room for requiring beyond a reasonable doubt for all sentencing facts.
See Posting of Steve Sady to Ninth Circuit Blog, http://circuit9.blogspot.com/
2005_01_01_circuit9_archive.html (Jan. 21, 2005, 7:15 EST); Doug Berman, Now
What? The Post-Booker Challenge For Congress and the Sentencing Commission, 18
FED. SENT'G REP. 157 (2006).
381 This is particularly true in indeterminate sentencing systems, where the
minimum term portion of the sentences "controls the period a defendant must serve
before eligibility for release, and thus the likelihood of the duration [served]. It does not,
however, absolutely control that duration; a parole board makes the subsequent release
decision." See Wool, supra note 205, at 139 (emphasis added).
382 Chanenson, supra note 212, at 187.
1370 [Vol. 68:1307
RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
characterized as good-time credits/punishment), and which officials
constitute the parole board.
As Steven Chanenson has pointed out, "[a]lthough discretionary parole
release is largely off the national sentencing reform radar, it remains a vital
part of American criminal justice." 383 Although parole has been eradicated
in the federal system, 384 it still plays a relatively large role in the states,
particularly in those states with indeterminate sentencing systems-the most
common approach to sentencing at this point.385 Approximately one-third of
all admissions to state prisons are individuals being returned for parole
violations. 386 Thus parole still plays an integral role on the back-end of
criminal sentencing procedures.
The Supreme Court has had difficulty defining the post-conviction rights
of prisoners, particularly in parole decisions. 387 In Morrissey v. Brewer,388
the Supreme Court noted that "parole is an established variation on
imprisonment of convicted criminals .... The essence of parole is release
from prison, before the completion of sentence, on the condition that the
prisoner abide by certain rules during the balance of the sentence." 389 In
other words, the Supreme Court essentially delegated its authority to the
prisons, holding that parole is less a post-prison sentencing procedure than
an in-prison reward. Nonetheless, parole is still subject to constitutional
requirements, despite the discretion 390 allowed to prison administrators. 391
383 Id.
384 See STrTH & CABRANES, supra note 114, at 5. Under the Sentencing Reform Act,
federal offenders sentenced to prison can no longer obtain early release on parole, which
has been abolished. Id.
385 Chanenson, supra note 212, at 187.
386 See Travis, supra note 7, at 2.
387 See Phillip Strach, Ohio Adult Parole Authority v. Woodward: Breathing New
"Life" into an Old Fourteenth Amendment Controversy, 77 N.C. L. REv. 891, 891
(1999). See also Greenholz v. Nebraska, 442 U.S. 1 (1979) (discussing parole release).
388 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
389 Id. at 477.
390 The Court recognized in Greenholz that a parole decision turns on a
"discretionary assessment of a multiplicity of imponderables, entailing primarily what a
man is and what he may become rather than simply what he has done." Greenholz, 442
U.S. at 10 (quoting Sanford H. Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert--Counsel in the
Peno-Correctional Process, 45 MINN. L. REv. 803, 813 (1961)). This is a classic example
of the 1970's rehabilitationist rationale.
391 Most recently, the Supreme Court weighed in on the Fourth Amendment right of
parolees in Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193 (2006). The Court held that the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit police officers from conducting these sorts of
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This leads us back to our original question: does Blakely affect parole?
The preliminary answer is no. Although parole may be in the orbit of the
general animating principles of Blakely, it may also be the least affected by
it. First, most terms of parole allow the offender an early release from his or
her sentence. Thus, if the maximum sentence is assumed to be the full term
of imprisonment, and a parole violator is forced to serve his or her full term,
it is hard to see how the decisions of the parole officer and/or the corrections
officials actually increase the prisoner's sentence beyond the maximum.
Second, and perhaps more critically, Blakely itself seems to specifically
exempt parole: "[o]f course indeterminate schemes involve judicial
factfinding, in that a judge (like a parole board) may implicitly rule on those
facts he deems important to the exercise of his sentencing discretion." 392
This exception for a parole board's sentencing discretion, originally
articulated by Morrissey, does not leave much room for the role of the jury
in parole hearings.
Finally, Williams seems to stand in the way of applying the Blakely
principles to parole. In Williams, described by one scholar as "[t]he 1949
bulwark of procedural laxity at sentencing," 393 the Supreme Court upheld
the exercise of unadulterated discretion against a due process challenge.
Williams' holding was explicitly premised on a rehabilitationist rationale,
which seemingly required an increase in the court's discretionary powers. 394
Under Williams's reasoning, sentencing authorities (both judges and
"nonjudicial agencies," including probation departments and departments of
correction) were required to have access to all possible information about the
convicted defendant, unrestricted by evidentiary and other limitations, on the
idea that with "careful study of the lives and personalities of convicted
offenders many could be less severely punished and restored sooner to
complete freedom and useful citizenship. '395 And as discussed above,
although rehabilitative philosophy has been mostly eradicated from parole
determinations, unadulterated discretion still remains. 396  Thus, the
suspicionless prisoner searches, because parole is a type of a prison term that continues
outside of the prison, and prisoners are normally subject to suspicionless searches. Id. at
2202.
392 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 309 (2004).
393 Reitz, supra note 216, at 1083.
394 Harris, supra note 91, at 85.
395 Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 249 (1949).
396 Post-Blakely, scholars have called for the overruling of Williams. See Reitz,
supra note 216, at 1082. Until this happens, however, we are still bound by its dictates.
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institution of parole, as the law currently stands, need not meet Blakely's
mandate.
Viewed most broadly, however, parole may be subject to Blakely's
animating principle-after all, the Sixth Amendment never draws a line
between punishment imposed inside and outside a prison. Stated differently,
if Blakely is expansively interpreted-that only juries may find facts that
increase an offender's punishment-then parole may come into its ambit.
Under this more sweeping interpretation, there are two areas where
Blakely could potentially affect parole: in the initial grant of parole by the
corrections department, and in the determination of whether a parolee has
violated her parole terms. Both are subject to the same general critique
regarding parole: that parole release, like many other sorts of "back-end"
ancillary sentencing proceedings, has "historically been an unstructured and
wildly discretionary power, subject to the same kinds of irrationalities and
abuses that afflict old-style, fully discretionary judicial sentencing on the
front-end. ' 397 It is also up for debate whether parole boards can realistically
predict regarding offenders' future criminal behavior. 398
To answer this Blakely question, it is necessary to delve deeper into the
details of parole supervision, at least as it functions in the states. In
indeterminate systems, parole is granted at the discretion of parole boards, 399
while in determinate sentencing systems, the earliest release date is fixed by
statute400 and can be granted after a prisoner has served a certain proportion
of his sentence, assuming good behavior. When a prisoner is up for parole,
he or she usually goes in front of the prison's parole board, staffed by
department of corrections or parole board officials, which determines
whether the offender is eligible for early release. 40 1 A majority of inmates
397 Chanenson, supra note 212, at 187 (citing Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of
Sentencing Reform, 54 EMORY L.J. 377,450 (2005)).
398 Chanenson, supra note 212, at 187.
399 Bamonte, supra note 239, at 126.
400 Id. at 133.
401 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-125 (West 2001 & Supp. 2007) (prisoner may
be paroled in discretion of panel of Board of Pardons and Paroles); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 947.13 (West 2001 & Supp. 2007) (same); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 127, § 136
(LexisNexis 2003) (release of prisoner by parole board solely on board's initiative); N.Y.
ExEc. LAW § 259-c (McKinney Supp. 2007) (same); OR. REv. STAT. § 144.050 (2005)
(same); TEx. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 493.005 (Vernon 2004), § 508.0441 (Vernon 2004 &
Supp. 2006) (same); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-136 (2005 & Supp. 2007) (same); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9.95.110 (West 2003 & Supp. 2007) (same).
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released.today have not "earned" their release, but have been automatically
released.402
Once released, parolees are supervised by parole field services
officers.40 3 Released offenders must regularly report to an assigned parole
officer, who, with the help of the parole board, determines whether the
parolee has "violated" parole by failing to comply with all terms and
conditions of parole.404 Determining whether the parolee has abided by these
regulations is the principal responsibility of the parole agent.40 5 These
conditions can include restrictions on association with felons/gang members;
mandatory meetings with parole officers; forbidden possession of weapons;
mandatory abstinence from drugs and alcohol; medical or psychiatric
treatment; frequent searches of persons, possessions, and residences; travel
requests; mandatory child support; school attendance; and community
service, among many others.40 6
Parole officers, however, tend to have large caseloads and little money to
truly supervise, help rehabilitate, or even meet with their released prisoners
on a regular basis.407 Such limited contact between parole officers and
parolees means that the officials who determine parole violations on a
regular basis do not have much data about the released offenders or "their
prospects when making revocation decisions." 40 8
Moreover, as a whole, parole agents have become "less kind and gentle"
in supervising released prisoners. 40 9 Parole officer training generally
provides little emphasis on casework and service referrals, but much more on
402 PETERSILIA, supra note 237, at 79.
4 0 3 Id. at 77.
404 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 3060 (West 2005) ("The parole authority [has] full
power to suspend or revoke any parole and to order returned to prison any prisoner on
parole."); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-126 (West Supp. 2007) (providing that the Board
of Pardons and Paroles establishes rules and regulations for parole); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 947.13(1)(c) (West 2001) (same); N.Y. ExEc. LAW § 259-c (McKiney 2005) (same);
OR. REV. STAT. § 144.040 (2005) (same); TEX. GOV'T CODE §§ 508.045, 508.0441
(Vernon 2004) (same); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-136(3) (2005) (same); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9.95.110 (West 2003) (same).
405 PETERSILIA, supra note 237, at 77.
406 See, e.g., 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/3-3-7a(l)-(16) (West Supp. 2007); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 65.10(2)(a)-(1) (McKinney 2004 & Supp. 20007); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 144.102 (2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN § 72.04A.080 (West 2003 & Supp. 2007);
CAL. CODE REGS., tit. 15, §§ 2512, 2513 (2007).
407 Bamonte, supra note 239, at 134.
408 Id.
409 PETERSILIA, supra note 237, at 11.
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law enforcement techniques. 410 This bias towards law enforcement
"increasingly reinforces the image of parole officers as cops rather than
social workers." 411 To enforce their powers, parole agents have legal
authority to carry and use firearms; to search people, places, and property
free of Fourth Amendment concerns; to order arrests without probable cause;
and to confine parolees without bail. 412 As Joan Petersilia has observed,
"[t]he ability to arrest, confine, and ... reimprison the parolee for violating
conditions of the parole agreement makes the parole agent a walking court
system."413
The revocation hearings are where the parole officer wields the greatest
power. Roughly one-third to one-half of all parolees faces a revocation
action. 414 These hearings are often "empty ritual[s] with a preordained
result,"415 imprisoning, without possibility of bail, almost every parolee
accused of a violation.4 16 After Morrissey, parolees are rarely represented by
defense counsel, and there are few, if any, confrontation or cross-
examination rights.417 It is not uncommon for a parole revocation to be based
on hearsay testimony of third parties contained only in police reports.418 The
minimal due process rights of parolees, combined with the
relaxed evidentiary requirements, the state's low burden of proof, the
modest cost of informal revocation hearings and the ineffectual defense put
up by nearly all parolees gives the state a chance to easily and cheaply
reincarcerate parolees based upon a minimal investment of a police report,
10-15 minutes of a hearing officer's time and some paperwork. 419
This is hardly a jury-determined imposition of punishment.
410 Id
411 Id.
4 1 2 Id. at 81-82.
4 1 3 Id. at 82.
4 14 See BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS-1990 667 (Kathleen Maguire & Timothy J. Flanagan
eds., 1991).
415 Bamonte, supra note 239, at 135. See generally Thomas Bamonte & Thomas M.
Peters, The Parole Revocation Process in Illinois, 24 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 211 (1993)
(criticizing the lack of due process in Illinois parole revocation proceedings).
416 Bamonte & Peters, supra note 415, at 224-25.
417 Bamonte, supra note 239, at 136.
418 Id
419 Id. (citations omitted).
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Because it is the parole officer who, for the most part, gets to make the
factual determination whether these violations have occurred, and whether to
bring the revocation action in the first place, this bureaucratic decision-
making seems to be a Blakely violation. By transferring power from the jury
to a parole officer, the ability to make the all-important determinations of
fact that increase punishment is removed from the community, where it
historically and rightfully belongs, to an arm of the vast corrections and
sentencing bureaucracy.
Because parole boards are administrative bodies, often entirely lacking
in legal training, and the parole hearings are usually secret, 420 extra
punishment is often given to a released offender with very few legal
protections. This violates the convicted offender's Sixth Amendment jury
right, and seems to run counter to Blakely. Jeremy Travis states this point
more strongly, arguing that parole violation adjudications are a form of
sentencing, and should be entitled to the same protections. 421
Ultimately, only the Supreme Court can make parole subject to Blakely's
dictates, as much as it may need reformation. 422 There is a strong case for
the expansion of Blakely's boundaries to include parole, however, if its
jurisprudential underpinnings are taken into account. Parole is an ancillary
sentencing proceeding most easily supervised by the community, as it takes
place outside of prison walls. Instead of having parole supervised by
overburdened parole officers with no ties to the neighborhood, parole could
be supervised by designated officials, either appointed or volunteer, who live
in and are invested in the community.
Having community members supervise parole, particularly for low-level
offenders, would ground the punishment in Sixth Amendment reasoning
without forcing extra burdens on the criminal jury. Moreover, requiring
some of the community service often required of parolees to happen in the
neighborhood where the offense occurred could help the injured community
heal. Using more local correctional resources would bring parole back into
the Blakely fold while simultaneously improving an area rife with
problems.423
420 PETERSILIA, supra note 237, at 87.
421 Travis, supra note 7.
422 As Kevin Reitz pointed out, parole boards are notoriously inefficient and
disappointing. See Reitz, supra note 216, at 1117-18.
423 For more on the distinct problems facing state parole systems, see LITTLE
HOOVER COMMISSION, SOLVING CALIFORNIA'S CORRECTION CRISIS: TIME IS RuNNING




Most states have a supervised period for offenders following
incarceration, although some states call it parole, some call it probation, and
some call it post-release supervision. For clarity's sake I will refer to this
supervised period as post-release supervision, notwithstanding the various
nomenclatures used. The terms and duration of post-release supervision are
usually set by the state legislature, with the duration of the supervision tied
to type and level of felony committed. Post-release supervision functions in
addition to any early or conditional release, since it is usually imposed only
after the majority of the original sentence has been served. Usually, the more
violent or dangerous the offense (as determined by the state legislature), the
longer the term of supervised release.424
New York provides an excellent example of how post-release
supervision can be a significant punishment. Since 1998, all violent New
York felonies must include a period of post-release supervision, ranging
from one to five years.425 Although the term of supervision imposed can
vary depending on the degree of the crime and the defendant's criminal
record, 426 the supervision is mandatory, and thus has a "definite, immediate
and largely automatic effect on defendant's punishment. '427 As the New
York Court of Appeals has noted: "Postrelease supervision is
significant .... In addition to supervision by and reporting to a parole
officer, postrelease supervision may require compliance with ... conditions
... including, for example, a curfew, restrictions on travel, and substance
abuse testing and treatment.... A violation of a condition of postrelease
supervision can result in reincarceration .... ,,428
424 See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3717(d)(1)(D)(i) (Supp. 2006) (imposition of an
extended post release supervision period for sex offenses); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 70.45(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 2007).
425 In 1998, the New York legislature eliminated parole for all violent felony
offenders, and enacted a determinate sentencing scheme to be followed by periods of
mandatory post-release supervision. See 1998 N.Y. Laws ch. 1. The legislature defined
each determinate sentence to "also include[], as a part thereof, an additional period of
post-release supervision." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.45(1) (McKinney 2004 & Supp. 2007).
426 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.45(1) (McKinney 2004 & Supp. 2007).
427 People v. Catu, 825 N.E.2d 1081, 1082 (N.Y. 2005).
428 Id.
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Thus, post-release supervision, overseen by the same bureaucratic and/or
judicial functionaries who supervise probation and parole, is another hidden
sentencing proceeding that may fall under the purview of Blakely.429
Because the post-release supervision term is determined by the
legislature, not the trial court, the Blakely problem only arises later, when the
defendant is released from incarceration and must meet with his probation or
parole officer on a weekly or bi-weekly basis. Any violation of post-release
supervision, which can range from association with known felons, to
consuming alcohol, to owning a gun, to failing to meet regularly with a
counselor, can potentially result in the released prisoner being placed back
into prison, up to ten years in certain cases. 430 This system of oversight
raises a similar problem to that of probation revocations: the failure to have
the jury determine any of the facts regarding supervision violations,
violations that can result in longer sentences and increased punishment.
In some cases, the increased punishment resulting from an offender's
violation of post-release supervision can extend the offender's prison term
longer than even the maximum envisioned by the legislature. This seems a
clear-cut violation of even the narrow definition of Blakely requiring that
only juries can determine facts that increase the sentence beyond the
maximum. By permitting a term of post-release supervision to be tacked onto
certain violent felonies in addition to the standard term of imprisonment and
allowing this special term to be supervised by the same bureaucracy that
enforces parole and probation, the actors increasing an offender's
punishment are very far away from the constitutional ideal. Although state
legislatures do have the right to impose extra punishments, like post-release
supervision, onto particular crimes, the oversight of such supervision must
be improved to meet with Blakely's requirements.
429 In 2003, the Kansas Supreme Court held that its post-release supervision period
for sexually violent crimes did not violate Apprendi because the defendant pleaded guilty
to the charge. See State v. Walker, 60 P.3d 937, 940 (Kan. 2003). No challenge has yet
been raised under Blakely.
430 See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 3000(b)(3) (West Supp. 2007). The statute
provides:
[I]n the case of any offense for which the inmate has received a life sentence.., the
period of parole shall be ten years. Upon the... grounds that the parole inmate may
pose a substantial danger to public safety, the Board of Prison Terms shall conduct a





Judges often have wide discretion over the restitution imposed on a
criminal defendant. Although the decision of when to impose restitution is
normally decided by the legislature, the amount of restitution imposed is
usually made solely by the trial court. I include restitution in my discussion
of back-end procedures because although the trial court decides the amount
of restitution during the sentencing hearing, the payment of such invariably
happens afterwards.
There are two ways in which a judge's determination of the restitution
amount may violate Blakely's animating principles. First, unless the court is
simply imposing a set amount dictated by the legislature, it must find facts to
determine the total sum, including the level of harm to the victim, the
offender's intent in committing the crime, and the offender's ability to pay.
Not all of these facts will have been previously found by the jury at trial, so
the court will often have to engage in de novo fact-finding. Second, and
more generally, a higher amount of restitution than the minimum set by the
legislature could potentially be viewed as an enhancement of the sentence,
since the greater the restitution, the more burden on the defendant.
Scholars and courts are divided about whether restitution is a criminal or
civil penalty. 431 Proponents of the latter argue that restitution is essentially a
civil remedy, not a criminal penalty, and thus the Sixth Amendment does not
apply. This line of reasoning has been adopted by a majority of the federal
courts, including the Third,432 Fifth,433 Sixth,434 Seventh, 435 Eighth, 436
Ninth,437 and Tenth438 Circuits, which have decided that the Apprendi-
Blakely line of cases does not prohibit fact-finding for restitution orders. The
431 See Brian Kleinhaus, Note, Serving Two Masters, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 2711,
2714 (2005) (arguing that since restitution is a form of punishment for convicted criminal
defendants, Blakely should apply); Grant Mainland, Note, A Civil Jury in Criminal
Sentencing, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1330 (2006); Melanie Wilson, In Booker's Shadow, 39
IND. L. REv. 379, 394 (2000) (arguing that the MVRA violates the Sixth Amendment).
432 United States v. Leahy, 438 F.3d 328, 338 (3d Cir. 2006) (en banc).
433 United States v. Garza, 429 F.3d 165, 170 (5th Cir. 2005) (per curiam).
434 United States v. Sosebee, 419 F.3d 451, 462 (6th Cir. 2005).
435 United States v. Day, 418 F.3d 746, 751 n.2 (7th Cir. 2005).
436 United States v. Carruth, 418 F.3d 900, 904 (8th Cir. 2005).
437 United States v. Bussell, 414 F.3d 1048, 1060 (9th Cir. 2005).
438 United States v. Visinaiz, 428 F.3d 1300, 1316 (10th Cir. 2005).
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issue is not as easily resolved as that, however, as demonstrated by the Third
Circuit's sharply divided en banc opinion in United States v. Leahy.
439
In Leahy, the Third Circuit ordered rehearing en banc in three separate
appeals to determine whether either of the trial courts' orders of
restitution440 violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury
under Blakely and Booker. The defendants argued that the facts underlying
the orders of restitution-found by the respective district courts-should
have been submitted to a jury and established by proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.441 In a seven-to-five vote, the Leahy en banc court held that the
amount of restitution need not be admitted by a defendant or proved to a
jury, since under the Victim and Witness Protection Act (VWPA) and the
Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), restitution is not the kind of
criminal punishment protected by the Sixth Amendment.
442
Although admitting that restitution orders made pursuant to criminal
convictions were criminal penalties, the Third Circuit decided that "a
restitution order does not punish a defendant beyond the 'statutory
maximum' as that term has evolved in the Supreme Court's Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence." 443 Arguing that the jury's verdict automatically
triggered restitution in the full amount of each victim's losses, the Leahy
majority concluded that under the MVRA and VWPA, restitution was both
authorized and required, as the district court merely gave "definite shape" to
the specific sum.444 The majority contended that restitution was a different
kind of criminal punishment than the criminal punishment of prison
sentences, since restitution did not "transform a defendant's punishment into
something more severe than that authorized by pleading to, or being
convicted of, the crime charged. '445 Paradoxically, the Third Circuit argued
that restitution was simultaneously a criminal punishment, but not truly-
that the "fiscal realignment" mandated by statutory restitution, despite its
439 See United States v. Leahy, 438 F.3d 328 (3d. Cir. 2006) (en banc) (majority
opinion seven judges, dissenting opinion five judges).
440 Leahy also addressed whether a district court's order of forfeiture violated the
Sixth Amendment (holding that it did not). See id. at 333.
441 Id.at 332.
442 Id. at 335-36.
443 Id. at 337.
444Id. at 337.
445 Leahy, 438 F.3d at 338.
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amount being determined by a court, did not really increase the punishment
borne by the defendant, since it was a "return to the status quo." 44 6
By this type of reasoning, however, the entirety of a defendant's
sentence itself might not be subject to the Apprendi-Blakely line of cases. If
part of the reason for imposing punishment through a jury, under the Sixth
Amendment, is to impose some sort of retributive penalty on the offender,
and thus pay back the victim and the community for the moral wrong done to
it/them by the defendant, then all punishment is based on a return to the
status quo. Essentially, there is no type of criminal punishment-from
imprisonment to fines to community service to probation-that does not
serve to return the community and victim to their starting point. Thus, if the
Third Circuit's argument is followed to its logical conclusion, its exclusion
of restitution orders under Blakely swallows up the rule.
At least two of the judges in the majority, however, were uncomfortable
with the majority's application of Blakely to restitution. Judges Fisher and
Barry concurred only in the majority's holding that restitution was not the
type of criminal penalty to which the right to a jury trial would attach,
refusing to reach the conclusion that restitution orders did not constitute an
increase in punishment beyond the statutory maximum for an offense. 447
The Leahy dissent, like the concurrence, dissented only from the
majority's conclusion that under Blakely and Booker, a judge can determine
the amount of restitution under the MVRA or VWPA without violating the
Sixth Amendment. 448 The dissent did not believe the facts determining the
amount of restitution could be found by a district court following the
Supreme Court's recent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, arguing that "the
relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect-does the required finding
[of the amount of loss] expose the defendant to a greater punishment than
that authorized by the jury's verdict?" 449 If, as the dissent argued, the
statutory maximum under Blakely was "the maximum sentence a judge may
impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or
admitted by the defendant," 450 then it would be difficult, if not impossible,
to exclude restitution from this sweep.
446 Id.
447 Id. at 339 (Fisher, J., joined by Barry, J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
448 Id. at 339 (McKee, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
449 Id. at 344 (McKee, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (alteration in
original) (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000)).
450 Blakely v. Washington, 543 U.S. 296, 303 (2004) (emphasis omitted).
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The dissent also pointed out that the majority's attempt to "avoid the
logical consequence of that rule" 451 by claiming that the "additional facts"
found by the judge to impose restitution are "not really additional facts at
all"452 was an ill-disguised attempt to suggest that restitution was simply a
restorative remedy, not an additional punishment.453 As the dissent noted,
"[r]estitution in any amount greater than zero clearly increases the
punishment that could otherwise be imposed. 454
More important for this analysis, however, was the dissent's argument,
repeated several times throughout the opinion, that both Blakely and Booker
held that the Sixth Amendment applied to any fact-finding that increased the
sentence beyond that which could be imposed by the jury's verdict alone.
These holdings were not limited to mere increases of length of
imprisonment.455 Because the Supreme Court did not limit its Sixth
Amendment analysis "by defining 'statutory maximum' as the maximum
sentence of incarceration or confinement (rather than punishment) that a
judge may impose on the basis of the verdict alone," 456 there is no reason to
exempt restitution from Blakely's ambit. The bright-line rule created by the
Supreme Court cannot be avoided through artificial divisions of what
"really" is punishment and what is not-or, in the words of the Leahy
dissent, "a distinction between punishment in the form of incarceration on
the one hand, and punishment in the form of restitution on the other."457
This larger point is most relevant to the question of imposing restitution
in the states. Assuming that at least some states would classify restitution as
a criminal-not civil-punishment, it seems only rational that judicial fact-
finding during the imposition of restitution might be disallowed by Blakely.
This is particularly true where the restitution is paid directly to the State, as
opposed to the victim. In that case, there is no possibility of simply
separating the restitution element from the criminal proceeding and
providing a civil remedy to the victim to be litigated separately. Instead,
because the State can be the money's recipient, the act of providing
restitution can also be classified as criminal.
451 Leahy, 438 F.3d at 343.
452 Id.
453 See id.
454 Id. at 344.
455 Id. at 347.
456 Leahy, 438 F.3d at 347.
457 Leahy, 438 F.3d at 348.
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Equally troubling are some of the state procedures used to determine the
amount of restitution. In California, for example, if the offender is not
statutorily eligible for probation, the trial court refers the matter to the
probation officer, who "investigat[es] . . . the facts relevant to determination
of the amount of a restitution fine.., in all cases where the determination is
applicable." 458 In other words, instead of having a jury or even a judge find
facts that increase an offender's penalty, California has a probation officer
perform that function. The California trial court has the discretion to direct a
probation officer to "investigate all facts relevant to the sentencing of the
person," 459 which presumably includes any fact-finding about the offender
relevant to restitution. When the probation officer makes a written report of
his findings, the findings must include a recommendation for the amount of
restitution necessary.460
California adds yet another layer of bureaucracy and distance from the
legitimacy of a jury by permitting the court to use both the probation
officer461 and a county financial evaluation officer to help set the amount of
restitution. 462 The probation officer investigates the viability of the statutory
restitution fine, including investigating "all facts relevant to the sentencing
of the person," 463 thus determining the first set of financial facts. The
financial evaluation officer then interviews the offender to determine her
financial ability to pay restitution, reporting the findings to the probation
officer.464 Thus, the fact-finding performed to determine how much the
offender can afford is three levels removed from any legitimate fact-finding.
The determination goes from the financial evaluation officer to the probation
officer to the court, without the jury's say.
Likewise, Florida's conditional release program can impose a payment
equaling the cost of supervision onto the released prisoner.465 Florida's
probation commission, which has sole authority to determine whether and
how much to order such repayment, considers the amount of the debt, the
financial resources of the released prisoner, his present and potential future




462 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12030) (West 2004).
463 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1203(g) (West 2004).
464 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 12030) (West 2004).
465 FLA. STAT. § 947.1405(2) (2005).
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financial needs and earning ability, and any other appropriate factors. 466
Under Florida law, the financial determination is wholly bureaucratic.
Contrast this with the Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals, which
recognized the breadth of Blakely. That court specifically observed: "[T]he
Blakely Court... spoke in broader terms of the power to punish: When a
judge inflicts punishment that the jury's verdict alone does not allow, the
jury has not found all the facts 'which the law makes essential to the
punishment,' ... and the judge exceeds his proper authority. 467
The Tennessee court also noted that the state's existing case law
expressly recognizes that the role of restitution is not merely to compensate
the victim, but also "to punish and rehabilitate the guilty"-a key tool for
Tennessee criminal punishment.468 Specifically, restitution in Tennessee is
"part of the sentencing scheme and in the nature of a penalty for crime" 469-
in other words, a criminal, not a civil, penalty. 470
If restitution, as I argue above, can be legitimately viewed as a criminal
penalty, then the rule of Blakely logically applies-and as such, requires
such factual determinations currently performed by either the trial court or
the probation department to be determined by a more democratic body.
Carving out a special Blakely exception for restitution orders may seem to be
the easiest way for now, but ignores Blakely's true impact on hidden aspects
of sentencing.
V. CONCLUSION
It is time to reform ancillary sentencing proceedings to comply with
Blakely's requirements. First, doctrinally, the Supreme Court's
understanding of the Sixth Amendment embraces the hidden front- and back-
ends of sentencing proceedings. Second, theoretically, it is unclear whether
most ancillary sentencing procedures actually work in the way they are
intended, either rehabilitatively, retributively, or on the basis of deterrence.
466 FLA. STAT. § 947.1405(2) (2005).
467 State v. White, No. W2003-0075 1 -CCA-R3-CD, 2004 WL 2326708, at *23
(Tenn. Crim. App. Oct. 15, 2004) (quoting Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303
(2004)) (alteration in original).
468 Id. at *24 (emphasis omitted).
469 Id.
470 Despite its expansive views of Blakely, however, the White Court held that a
judicial finding of an amount of restitution does not run afoul of the Due Process or Sixth
Amendment guarantees as interpreted in Blakely, since no Tennessee statutes specify a
maximum amount of restitution. See id.
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These arguments combine to create a new way to think about both hidden
sentencing procedures and the rights due to offenders after the trial has
ended and the punishment has begun.
Ultimately, extending the animating principles of Blakely calls a variety
of ancillary sentencing proceedings into question. Our understanding of
sentencing has far too often been satisfied with mere superficiality, with
little interest in exploring the jurisprudential undercurrents that have
animated all aspects of sentencing, front-end and back-end.
Faced with a new paradigm of sentencing rights based on retributive
justice, however, we can no longer ignore the skewed workings of
sentencing proceedings as a whole. Once the Blakely Court focused on the
traditional role of the community in imposing punishment, the scope of
sentencing widened: not only must the community have its say in sentencing
the offender at the actual sentencing hearing, it must also have some sort of
imprimatur in the hidden aspects of our sentencing proceedings, from
beginning to end. Excluding front- and back-end sentencing proceedings
from the reach of the community's values is doing precisely what Blackstone
foresaw in his crusade against "secret machinations" eroding the jury right.
When we fully incorporate the community's role in imposing
punishment, we may well suffer some "delays" and "little inconveniences"
in sentencing offenders. Although the rush to justice-which happens far too
often in our criminal justice system with charge-bargaining, guilty pleas, and
appeal waivers-may resist the time it takes to fully provide an offender
with all of her Sixth Amendment rights, the unregulated, "invisible
punishments" 471 imposed during the hidden phases of sentencing can have
an outsized effect.
The contours of my expressive retributive theory of sentencing sketched
out above are not absolute; unlike the Court, I do not seek to draw any
bright-line rules. But whatever the limits of this jurisprudence may be, I am
sure that it encompasses hidden sentencing. Our system of front- and back-
end sentencing has for too long been "invisible, hidden from public view,
difficult to discern in part because we do not use the language of
punishment, criminal sanctions, and sentencing to describe these
phenomena." 472 It is well past time that these ancillary sentencing
proceedings come into the Blakely fold.
471 See Travis, supra note 7, at 4.
472 Id.
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